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1. Introduction
This thesis is a collection of essays in applied microeconomic theory
that deal with issues of market design, incomplete information, and
imperfect competition.
It is composed of three parts:
• Part I: Procurement of innovation: tournaments vs auctions
• Part II: Strategic information transmission in sequential auc-
tions
• Part III: Signaling in market games with downstream interac-
tion.
Part I deals with the procurement of innovations and compares the
performance of two prominent procurement mechanisms: scoring
2 Introduction
auctions and fixed-prize tournaments, two widely used and well
documented methods to procure innovations.
In the past, when intellectual property rights were not well estab-
lished and royalty licensing was not feasible, fixed-prize tournaments
were employed to procure major innovations. In 1795, Napole´on
Bonaparte offered a prize of FF12.000 for a method of food preser-
vation that was in high need to serve his military excursions across
Europe. The winner of that tournament was Nicolas Appert, who
invented the method of food canning, which is still widely used today.
And in 1714 the British Parliament offered a prize of £20.000 for a
method to determine longitude at sea, following a series of maritime
disasters. That prize was won by John Harrison who invented the
first mechanical chronometer.1
More recent examples range from the procurement of weapon sys-
tems, energy efficient refrigerators, and pharmaceutical innovations,
to the awarding of academic grants and fellowships, to name just a
few.
Similarly, scoring auctions are widely used in the procurement of
1However, the prize committee was dominated by astronomers who pursued their
own agenda, sabotaged the work of the clockmaker, and tried to withhold the
prize from him (see Sobel, 1996).
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goods and services that involve innovative activity. For example,
when the clients of the World Bank procure the design or construction
of a power plant or of a national health care system, contractors
compete not only with price, but also with technical proposals that
lay out innovative solutions to problems of technical or institution
design. Price and quality are then mapped into a unique score, based
on a fixed scoring rule, and the contract is awarded to whoever
reaches the highest score.
Inspired by these and other examples, R&D contests were analyzed
extensively in the theoretical literature, in particular by Taylor (1995),
who introduced the base model employed by the subsequent liter-
ature, and Fullerton and McAfee (1999), Fullerton, Linster, Mc-
Kee, and Slate (2002), Che and Gale (2003), and Scho¨ttner (2008)
who compared the relative performance of auctions and fixed-prize
tournaments under different assumptions concerning the innovation
technology and feasibility of entry fees.
A key (implicit) assumption of the literature on R&D contests, with
which we take issue here, is that contestants submit their best in-
novation regardless of its value. This ignores that innovators may
withhold innovations that are worth considerably more than the prize,
so that only the “lemons”, i.e., the inferior innovations are submitted.
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If there is only one potential user of the innovation, i.e., if the pro-
curer is a monopsonist, the procurer can in principle prevent this
adverse selection problem by committing himself to never bargain
with innovators who bypass the contest. However, such a commit-
ment is difficult to achieve.
There are many cases where innovations were inspired by a contest,
but innovators ultimately decided to bypass the contest when they
felt that their innovation had a substantially higher commercial value
than the prize offered by the contest, and then successfully negotiated
more profitable license agreements after bypassing the contest.
A case in point is the invention of celluloid. Its inventor, John Wesley
Hyatt, was encouraged to develop a new substance after he saw
an advertisement by Phelan & Collander, offering $10,000 to the
person who invented a usable substitute for ivory in billiard balls.
He eventually succeeded by inventing celluloid, which seemed to be
a perfect substitute for ivory in billiard balls, but finally decided to
patent his innovation instead of submitting it to the tournament and
collecting the prize. This allowed him to license his innovation not
only for use in billiard balls, but also in a variety of other products,
ranging from film and ping-pong balls to dental plates.
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Motivated by this and other examples, our essay analyzes the procure-
ment of innovations when the procurer is unable to commit himself
to never bargain with innovators and innovators consider to bypass
a contest and engage in bargaining after the contest game has been
played.
As another important departure from the bulk of the literature, we
allow the procurer to collect entry fees from those who register for
the contest. Entry fees are important because without them contests
lack an important tool for surplus extraction. This is particularly
important in auctions which are seriously handicapped relative to
fixed-prize contests if no entry fees are used.2
Altogether, we show that if bypass is possible and entry fees may
be collected, the optimal fixed-prize tournament outperforms the
optimal auction. Essentially, this result is due to the distinct role that
entry fees play in the two mechanisms: In the optimal auction, entry
fees are necessary, even if bypass is not an issue. If bypass is possible,
2As we show in our base model on pages 37-40, in the absence of a bypass
problem, if one does not use entry fees the auction is generically inferior to the
fixed-prize contest, because the auction can neither assure participation nor full
surplus extraction without using entry fees, while the fixed prize contest can
assure both without entry fees.
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high entry fees induce bypass, and bypass can only be prevented by
lowering the entry fee, which cuts into the procurer’s expected profit.
Whereas in fixed-prize tournaments, entry fees are less important.
There, the procurer can easily deter bypass by setting a sufficiently
high prize and then (partially) offset the resulting reduction in his
expected profit by raising the entry fee.
Part II deals with issues of strategic information transmission that
occur if bidders participate in a sequence of auctions and bidders’
valuations are correlated across auctions. In such a framework, the
outcome of the early auction may reveal information concerning bid-
ders’ valuations which may adversely affect their expected payoffs
in later auctions.
Many market transactions have the structure of an auction, and many
such auctions are recurring events. For example, price competition
between retailers is essentially a (reverse) auction. And this auction
is typically a recurring event in which the relevant valuations (unit
costs) are stable, at least for some time. Assuming stable or perfectly
correlated valuations is appropriate for analyzing wine, stamp, and
real estate auctions where different lots of (almost) identical goods
are usually auctioned within minutes to the same group of potential
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buyers.
Evidently, in these cases bidders must pay attention to the informa-
tion they reveal about their valuations through their bids. This gives
rise to a problem of strategic information transmission.
In a first-price auction with publicly observed bids (which is ana-
lyzed in Chapter 4) bidders can infer the underlying valuations from
observed bids, if equilibrium strategies are monotone. Of course,
bidders take into account that their bids affects others’ beliefs, and
adjust their bidding behavior in such a way that the inference from
observed bids to underlying valuations is somewhat blurred, to which
we refer as a case of “signal jamming”.
As a result, partial pooling occurs in the sense that bidders with a
high valuation imitate the bidders with a low valuation, with positive
probability, in order to keep the rivals in the dark about their true
type, until the last auction is played.
Part III focuses on the interaction between strategic behavior and
subsequent downstream interaction in an oligopoly aftermarket, us-
ing the examples of wage bargaining and takeover bidding. The
common feature in both applications is that the negotiated wages
8 Introduction
resp. the observed winning bid in a takeover contest serve as a signal
of the respective players’ type, which affects the interaction in the
downstream oligopoly market. Players take this signaling aspect
into account, which may give rise to inflated equilibrium wages
respectively takeover bids.
Decentralized Union-Oligopoly Wage Bargaining The wage bar-
gaining application is covered in Chapter 5 (based on Ding (2010)).
It is motivated by the classical labor literature which claimed that
decentralized wage bargaining leads to significantly lower wages
than industry wide bargaining.
In the literature on collective wage bargaining one finds two funda-
mentally distinct approaches: the so-called “right-to-manage” and
the “complete labor contracts” model.3 Whereas the complete con-
tract model assumes that unions and employers negotiate complete
contracts that stipulate wages and employment in each firm, the
right-to-manage model assumes that unions and employers negotiate
3The model of complete labor contracts was introduced by Leontief (1946) and
later extended McDonald and Solow (1981); the right-to-manage model was
introduced by Oswald (1982) and subsequently used by Dowrick (1989), by
Dixon (1988) and others.
Introduction 9
wages but leave the choice of employment to the discretion of each
firm.
The protagonists of the complete contract model emphasize that
complete contracts assure efficiency, while incomplete contracts give
rise to inefficient combinations of wages and employment, because
the wage-employment combinations on the labor demand function
are off the contract curve. Essentially, this is due to the fact that if
wages exceed the competitive wage, firms reduce employment below
the efficient level. This distortion of efficiency, which resembles the
well-known welfare loss of monopoly, can be remedied by writing
complete labor contracts that control wages and employment, just
like a perfectly price discriminating monopoly that controls both
quantity and price can extract the full surplus.
The protagonists of the right-to-manage model of wage bargaining
emphasize that complete contracts are impractical already because
the event space may be too large and, more fundamentally, because
firms are subject to unpredictable events which cannot be handled by
contingent contracts that can only condition on predictable events.
Moreover, contingent contracts may not be feasible due to lack of
verifiability. As Aghion and Holden (2011, p.190) put it in their
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recent survey of the incomplete contracts approach:4
“Perhaps the central issue is that economic actors . . . cannot
anticipate all possible contingencies. It might well be
that certain states of nature or actions cannot be veri-
fied by third parties after they arise, . . . , and thus can-
not be written into an enforceable contract. When con-
tracts are incomplete, . . . , any contract negotiated in
advance must leave some discretion . . . [to] the “owner”
of the firm . . . ”
Apart from these theoretical arguments, the matter must ultimately
be settled by looking at the facts, which were studied and reviewed
in Hall and Lilien (1979) and McCurdy and Pencavel (1986). They
found that the typical labor contract is incomplete and typically pre-
scribes wages (and sometimes labor time) but allows firms to choose
the number of employees. This suggests that the right-to-manage
model is the more appropriate approach to study wage bargaining.
Assuming the right-to-manage model, a classical theme of the labor
4However, Maskin and Tirole (1999) showed that, by using an intelligent reve-
lation mechanism, one can make observable information verifiable to a third
party. This suggests that lack of verifiability may not preclude state contingent
contracts, contrary to what is commonly presumed.
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literature is the comparison of centralized and decentralized wage
bargaining in oligopolistic industries. Centralized bargaining is pre-
dominant in countries like Germany, where industry wide unions
bargain with centralized associations of employers, whereas decen-
tralized bargaining is predominant in countries like the U.S., where
employees of a firm typically chose a particular union that represents
them in collective bargaining with their employer, if they choose
collective bargaining at all.
The main result of that literature is that centralized collective bar-
gaining in an oligopoly gives rise to higher wages, because if unions
negotiate with employers at the industry rather than the firm level, the
negotiations capture the benefits of implicit collusion in the product
market. Essentially, by raising wages not only for the own firm but
also for the rival firm, the wage increase is less costly to employers,
because it also increases the rival’s cost, which partially compensates
the increased cost in the form of a reduced output of rival firms.
In our essay on wage bargaining we reconsider the analysis of de-
centralized wage bargaining and modify the usual analysis in several
directions. First of all, we assume that the union does not engage
in an ultimatum game and sets a take-it-or-leave it wage (as in the
most of the literature that considers a “monopoly union”), but instead
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assume that union and employer engage in cooperative bargaining,
maximizing the Nash product of their gains from trade. Secondly,
we introduce incomplete information by assuming that firm-union
coalitions have private information concerning their productivity, i.e.,
they know their own productivity but not that of other firm-union
coalitions. Third, we assume that firms observe each others’ wage
settlements before they choose employment and play the downstream
oligopoly game.
The presence of private information concerning productivity and
the observability of wage settlements gives rise to a signalling issue.
When firm-union coalitions negotiate a wage per worker, they must
take into account how their own wage settlement alters the beliefs of
rival firms concerning each other’s cost. In particular, a higher wage
settlement may signal a higher productivity, which confers a strategic
advantage in the subsequent downstream oligopoly game. Of course,
in equilibrium, no misleading signalling occurs, which suggests
that the potential for signalling gives rise to a pointwise higher
equilibrium wage schedule. Equilibrium wages are thus inflated
to such an extent that exaggerated signalling is deterred because it
becomes too costly.
This result is not only interesting in itself, it has also implications for
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the comparison between centralized and decentralized wage bargain-
ing. Of course, we do not negate that centralized wage bargaining
contributes to wage inflations, because it captures the benefits of
implicit collusion extracted from consumers. However, we show
that this effect is at least partially compensated by the wage inflation
induced in decentralized bargaining by the firms’ attempts to signal
their strength which is geared to gain a strategic advantage in the
subsequent oligopoly game.
Mergers and takeover bidding The takeover application is cov-
ered in Chapter 6 (based on Ding, Fan, and Wolfstetter (2010)). It
is motivated by the analysis of mergers and the merger paradox in
an oligopoly framework, when mergers are subject to synergies in
the form of cost reductions. There, we analyze takeover bidding
between oligopoly firms that have private information concerning
the synergy effect due to merging their firm with a takeover target,
employing a somewhat unusual but highly profitable auction rule.
The classical merger paradox has been introduced by Salant, Switzer,
and Reynolds (1983) who observed that, in a simple Cournot oligopoly,
mergers are not profitable to the firms that merge unless almost all
firms (the rule of thumb is “at least 80% of all firms”) merge. Of
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course, large mergers are typically not approved by antitrust au-
thorities who, as a rule, prohibit mergers that achieve a position of
market dominance. This finding is somewhat paradoxical because
one might argue that the merged firm can always maintain the output
strategy that its members played prior to the merger. Therefore, one
may think that a merger should never lower the profits of those who
merge.
However, this reasoning is flawed, essentially because it ignores that
the merged firm is just one player of the game it plays with those
who are not part of the merger. In the absence of synergies, the firms
that are not part of the merger are happy to learn about the merger,
and respond to the thus reduced competition by raising their outputs.
Similarly, the merged firm will also reduce its output below the level
of the pre-merger aggregate output of its members in order to take
advantage of reduced competition. As a result, equilibrium profits of
all firms, merged and not merged alike, increase, but the increased
profit of the merger does not compensate the loss of profits of those
firms that have vanished due to the merger.5
5Note that a merger would always be profitable if it could be kept secret. However,
mergers are always publicly observed, because they have to be approved by
antitrust authorities who in turn must publish their decisions.
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In the subsequent literature it has been observed that the picture does
change if a merger entails synergies. Such synergies may take the
form of cost reductions that may be realized by retaining the most
efficient departments of the merged firms and closing the inefficient
ones. Synergies may also take the form of streamlining product lines
or of taking advantage of complementarities between products in
multi-product firms.
Cost reducing synergies were introduced into the analysis of mergers
in oligopoly by Farrell and Shapiro (1990), and product differenti-
ation and Bertrand competition were introduced by Deneckere and
Davidson (1985). Altogether, these contributions showed that even
small mergers may be profitable.
In our essay on mergers we also allow for synergies but introduce
private information, assuming each firm knows which level of cost
reduction it may realize by merging with a given takeover target,
but does not know the cost reductions that may be realized by other
mergers with the takeover target.
Another ingredient of our analysis is that mergers take place through
takeover bidding. The presence of private information makes auc-
tions appealing in mergers and acquisitions. And indeed, auctions
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are widely used in practice (see the empirical study by Boone and
Mulherin, 2007). Under the predominant corporate law in the U.S.
(which is the Delaware corporate law), auctions are even compelling,
because under that law,
“ . . . once a takeover offer has been made, the board
of directors is actually obliged to act like an auction-
eer, and get the best price for the stockholder of the
company, which is one of the reasons why a takeover
offer must remain open for at least 20 business days”
(Cramton, 1998).
The fact that bidders are competitors in a downstream oligopoly
implies that the takeover auction is a somewhat unusual auction
game in which bidding is subject to externalities. In particular,
since non-merged firms benefit from a merger if synergies are low,
bidders are subject to a positive externality with positive probability.
Whereas if synergies are sufficiently high, bidders are subject to a
negative externality.
Another particular feature of takeovers is the fact that ownership
stakes in the merged firm make post-merger profits verifiable to all
co-owners. Therefore, it becomes feasible to make the price to be
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paid by the winner of the takeover contest conditional on the post-
merger profitability. This is achieved by adopting a share auction in
lieu of a standard cash auction. In such a share auction the winner
of the auction awards the original owners of the takeover target an
ownership stake in the newly formed merged firm. This ownership
stake entitles the original owners to earn a share of the profit of the
merged firm.
As we show, share auctions are more profitable than cash auctions.
The bidder who offers the highest share offers the highest overall
payment, and that overall payment is pointwise higher than the bid in
a corresponding cash auction. Altogether, this surprising result can
be viewed as an implication of the “linkage principle”. According
to that principle, linking the price to a variable that is correlated
with bidders’ private information lowers bidders’ information rent
(Milgrom, 1987).
Share auctions are not only interesting in theory, they are also widely
used in real world takeover contests. A prominent recent example
is the takeover of GE Insurance Solutions (a major reinsurer) by
Swiss Re, which made Swiss Re the world’s largest player in the
oligopolistic reinsurance market. Several bidders participated in
that takeover contest, including the famous investor Warren Buffett.
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Interestingly, the winning bid offered GE a significant ownership
stake which made GE a major shareholder of Swiss Re (see Boyle,
2005).
Our essay combines these unique features of takeover auctions: the
presence of significant externalities due to the downstream interac-
tion among bidders, the possible use of share auctions in lieu of
standard cash auctions, and the potential to signal strength through
bids.
Our main results are that the bidding games have a separating equilib-
rium even though firms may be subject to a positive externality and
that profit-share auctions are more profitable than standard cash auc-
tions, regardless of whether firms observe the merged firm’s synergy
parameter or only an imperfect signal of it.
Part I.
Procurement of Innovation:
Tournaments vs Auctions

2. Prizes and Lemons:
Procurement of Innovation
under Imperfect Commitment1
2.1. Introduction
Contests are a widely used and well documented method to procure
innovations. In the past, fixed-prize tournaments were employed
to procure major bottleneck innovations. For example, in 1795
Napoleon Bonaparte offered a prize of FF12.000 for a method of food
preservation that was in high need to serve his military excursions
across Europe. The winner of that tournament was Nicolas Appert,
who invented the method of food canning, which is still widely used
1This chapter is based on Ding and Wolfstetter (2011a).
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today.2 In 1714 the British Parliament offered a prize of £20.000
for a method of determining longitude at sea, following a series of
maritime disasters. That tournament was won by John Harrison who
invented the first mechanical chronometer to provide reliable time
measurement service at sea.3 More recent examples range from the
procurement of weapon systems, energy efficient refrigerators,4 and
pharmaceutical innovations5 to the awarding of academic grants and
fellowships, to name just a few.
Contests in the form of a scoring auction are also widely used in
the procurement of goods and services that involve innovative ac-
tivity. For example, when the World Bank procures the design or
2In-container sterilization is known as “appertisation” in francophone regions, in
memory of Nicolas Appert.
3However, the prize committee was dominated by astronomers who pursued their
own agenda, sabotaged the work of the clockmaker, and tried to withhold the
prize from him. For a vivid account of these incidents see Sobel (1996).
4In 1991 a $10 million prize was sponsored. Whirlpool won the tournament but
never collected the prize because it failed to sell the 250.000 units required
within the first five years after the tournament (see Langreth, 1994).
5Recently, the U.S. Congress discussed setting up a “Medical Innovation Prize
Fund” with an annual budget of $8 billion (see Stiglitz, 2006) and the NSF set
up a huge Experimental Innovation Inducement Prize Program (see National
Research Council, 1982).
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construction of a power plant or a national health care system, poten-
tial contractors compete not only with price, but also with technical
proposals that lay out innovative solutions to problems of technical
or institution design (see The World Bank, 2004a,b).
Elements of a research contest are also present in architecture compe-
titions where designers and contractors are typically asked to present
pilot proposals that are rewarded with fixed cash prizes and that play
a crucial role in the final selection.
Inspired by these and other examples, R&D contests were analyzed
extensively in the recent theoretical literature. In his seminal paper
Taylor (1995) introduced a model of innovation activity that has
been widely used and adapted in the subsequent literature. There,
innovations are measured by their value added (the increment in
wealth that their application would induce), and innovation activities
are viewed as costly draws from a given i.i.d. probability distribution
of innovations, similar to the independent private-values model in
auction theory. The intensity of innovation activity is described
by an optimal stop-rule that prescribes continued draws until either
a threshold value of the innovation is reached or the deadline of
submission has been reached.
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Fullerton and McAfee (1999) simplify this analysis by letting inno-
vators chose a fixed number of draws in lieu of the optimal stop rule,
extend the analysis by introducing asymmetric innovators whose
cost of innovation differ, and propose that the procurer should in-
duce the best selection of contestants through auctioning the right to
participate in the contest to a fixed number of innovators.
Fullerton, Linster, McKee, and Slate (2002) and Che and Gale (2003)
compare the profitability of procuring innovations by fixed-prize
tournaments and auctions, and show that auctions are more profitable
for the procurer. Two major restrictions of the analysis by Che
and Gale (2003) are a deterministic innovation technology and the
exclusion of entry fees.
Scho¨ttner (2008) reconsidered their finding and shows that a fixed-
prize tournament may be more profitable for the procurer than an
auction. Like Che and Gale (2003) her analysis assumes that entry
fees cannot be employed by the procurer; however, unlike Che and
Gale (2003) she assumes a stochastic innovation technology and
replaces their simultaneous moves mechanism game by a sequential
game in which innovators observe each others’ innovations before
they engage in bidding. She finds a sufficient condition for the
superiority of fixed-prize tournaments. That condition requires that
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the probability distribution of the quality difference between firms’
innovations either dominates an exponential distribution or exhibits
log-convexity.
The literature on R&D contests implicitly assumes that contestants
submit their best innovation regardless of its value. This assumption
ignores that innovators may withhold innovations that are worth
considerably more than the prize, so that only the lemons, i.e., the
inferior innovations are submitted. If there is only one potential
user of the innovation, i.e., if the procurer is a monopsonist, the
procurer can in principle prevent this adverse selection problem by
committing himself to never bargain with innovators who bypass the
contest. However, such a commitment is difficult to achieve.6
There are many cases where innovations were inspired by a contest,
but innovators ultimately decided to bypass the contest when they
6In principle, the procurer could write a contract with a third party that stipulates a
high penalty whenever he procures from someone who did not participate in the
contest. However, a procurer must always consider the possibility that superior
innovations are forthcoming from outside innovators, for example because they
did not know about the contest or did not expect to contribute to this particular
application. No procurer would want to forego such potential trades. Moreover,
such arrangements invite either renegotiation or may induce collusion between
innovators and the third party, with the intention to collect the penalty.
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felt that their innovation had a substantially higher commercial value
than the prize offered by the contest, and then successfully negotiated
more profitable license agreements after bypassing the contest.7
For example, the inventor John Wesley Hyatt was encouraged to
develop a new substance after he saw an advertisement by Phelan
& Collander, offering $10,000 to the person who invented a usable
substitute for ivory in billiard balls. Hyatt eventually succeeded
by inventing celluloid, which seemed to be a perfect substitute for
ivory in billiard balls, but finally decided to patent his innovation
instead of submitting it to the tournament and collecting the prize.8
This bypass of the fixed-prize tournament allowed him to license
his innovation not only for use in billiard balls, but also in a variety
of other products, ranging from film and ping-pong balls to dental
plates.9
7See the excellent survey by Cabral, Cozzi, Denicolo´, Spagnolo, and Zanza (2006).
8As reported in Wikipedia “the English inventor Daniel Spill developed the same
product which he patented in England as ‘Xylonite’, and later pursued Hyatt in
a number of costly court cases between 1877 and 1884. The eventual outcome
found that the true inventor of celluloid was Alexander Parkes, and that all
manufacturing of celluloid could continue, including Hyatt’s.”
9Despite its initial success, the popularity of celluloid billiard balls diminished
rapidly after a number of incidents caused by the high flammability of celluloid.
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Motivated by this and other examples, the present chapter analyzes
the procurement of innovations when the procurer is unable to com-
mit to never bargain with innovators and innovators consider to
bypass a contest in the event that they draw a high value innovation,
when the value of innovation is not verifiable to third parties, and
when the benefits of innovation accrue exclusively to the procurer.
We compare two different methods to procure innovations: fixed-
prize tournaments and (scoring) auctions, and determine which of
these mechanisms is more profitable for the procurer if both mech-
anisms are potentially subject to a bypass and subsequent lemons
problem.10
Our main finding is that this imperfect commitment generally affects
the profitability of both mechanisms, but in substantially different
ways, and depending on whether one employs a simple fixed-prize
tournament or amends it by requiring advance registration and entry
fees, just like in the optimal auction.
Altogether, we show that the optimal fixed-prize tournament outper-
forms the optimal auction. Specifically, we construct a fixed-prize
tournament that prevents bypass (just like the optimal auction) and
matches the profitability of the optimal auction. However, we also
10For a survey of alternative methods to procure innovations see Scotchmer (2005).
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identify cases in which the optimal fixed-prize tournament is strictly
more profitable than the optimal auction. Interestingly, a simple
fixed-prize tournament that does not employ entry fees can be more
profitable than the optimal auction that employs entry fees.
The intuition for this result is as follows. In the auction, entry fees
are essential for surplus extraction by the procurer, yet high entry
fees induce bypass. Therefore, in order to deter bypass, the procurer
needs to significantly lower the entry fee, which reduces his expected
profit. In fixed-prize tournaments, entry fees are not essential for
surplus extraction, and the procurer must be primarily concerned
with setting a sufficiently high prize to deter that innovators bypass
ex post, after they have drawn their innovations. Of course, a high
prize also reduces the procurer’s expected profit, but this may be
offset by charging an entry fee, as long as this does not induce ex
ante bypass.
The plan of the chapter is as follows: sections 2.2 and 2.3 introduce
the model and show that the optimal auction and fixed-prize tourna-
ment are revenue equivalent under perfect commitment. In section
2.4 we compare the profitability of the two mechanisms under im-
perfect commitment when innovators may bypass the mechanism
and construct a fixed-prize tournament that is equally profitable as
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the optimal auction. In section 2.5 we state sufficient conditions for
the strict superiority of the optimal fixed-prize tournament and offer
some intuition. And in section 2.6 we show that the auction cannot
be improved by applying an ex post minimum score requirement in
addition to ex ante entry fees. The chapter closes with a discussion
in section 2.7. Several proofs are in the appendix.
2.2. The model
A risk neutral procurer wishes to buy an innovation from one of two
short-listed innovators, using either a fixed-prize tournament or a
scoring auction. The procurer can commit to employ one of these
mechanisms, but is unable to commit to never trade with an innovator
who bypassed it.
Innovation technology: Innovation is modeled as an i.i.d. random
variable, X , drawn from the c.d.f. G : [x, x¯]→ [0,1] with positive
density g everywhere, at cost c > 0. X measures the increment in
wealth that result if the procurer adopts it. The innovation has no
value for anyone other than the procurer. G is such that H(x) :=
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∫ x
0 G(y)dy is log-concave for all x .
11 For convenience, the support
of G is normalized to [0,1]. Order statistics of the sample of two
random draws are denoted by X(1) ≥ X(2), and, as a rule, random
variables are denoted by capital and realizations by lowercase letters.
Information: At the time when the contest is played, innovations
are innovators’ private information. That information becomes
known to the procurer only after the contest game has been played or
a bypass has occurred. Innovations are not verifiable to third parties,
which restricts the set of feasible auction rules and rules out the use
of bilateral contracts.
Contests: The procurer adopts either a fixed-prize tournament or a
scoring auction. In the fixed-prize tournament the procurer sets a
prize p to be paid to the best submitted innovation and possibly an en-
try fee, f , to be paid by innovators who register for the tournament.12
If an innovator registers, innovates, and submits his innovation, he
earns p− f − c if he wins and − f − c if he loses. In the auction,
11Log-concavity is frequently assumed in information economics (see the survey by
Bagnoli and Bergstrom, 2005). The assumed log-concavity of H is obviously
weaker than log-concavity of G.
12In the language of contest design, this is a “best-in-class” rather than a “first-past-
to-post” contests.
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the procurer selects a scoring rule, a pricing rule, and an entry fee f .
The scoring rule maps an innovation, x , and a financial proposal, b
(the smallest price requested for the innovation), into a score, S, and
then selects the highest score as winner. The pricing rule maps the
winner’s score into the price that the procurer shall pay.
Since innovations are not verifiable by third parties, the only incentive-
compatible scoring rule is the non-discriminating rule, S(x,b) =
x−b, that scores bids by the net surplus that they promise to deliver
to the procurer; and the only incentive-compatible auction is the first-
score auction that requires the procurer to pay the winner the price
he requested, b (see Che and Gale, 2003). This does, however, not
rule out using the second-score auction as a proxy of the first-score
auction, as explained later by Lemma 2.1.
In the following we denote the procurer’s payoff by pip and innova-
tors’ payoff by pi ; occasionally we add a superscript to identify the
kind of contest, and write either a for auction or t for tournament.
Since innovators may bypass the contest prescribed by the procurer,
the contest rules do not fully describe the game played between
the procurer and innovators. In addition, we need to consider the
bargaining game between innovator and procurer that applies if one
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or both innovators bypass the contest.
Bargaining in the event of bypass: The procurer engages in bar-
gaining if either both innovators or only the owner of the superior
innovation bypassed. For simplicity, we indicate the (owners of the)
superior and inferior innovation by subscripts 1 and 2, and char-
acterize the outcome of the bargaining game by the Nash (1950)
bargaining solution.
Suppose only innovator 1 bypassed. Then, the procurer already
has the inferior innovation, x2, for which he is obliged to pay a
transfer, t2, determined by the rules of the mechanism in which 2 had
participated. Hence, the procurer’s default payoff is equal to x2− t2,
while that of innovator 1 is equal to zero since innovations have no
alternative use.
Denote the price negotiated between the two parties by P and note
that the payoff of the innovator is equal to P . The bargaining parties
maximize the Nash product of their payoffs, subject to the budget
constraint,
max
pip,P
(
pip− (x2− t2)
)
P, s.t. pip+ P+ t2 ≤ x1. (2.1)
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Evidently, the maximizer is P = 12 (x1− x2), pip = 12 (x1+ x2)− t2.
Hence, in the event of one bypass, the equilibrium price of the
superior innovation is equal to
P = 1
2
(x1− x2) , (2.2)
and the total price paid by the procurer is P+ t2.
Now suppose both innovators bypassed. In that case we assume that
the procurer bargains first with innovator 1, and only if that nego-
tiation fails, bargains with innovator 2.13 This bargaining problem
is solved by backward induction. First, we solve the bargaining
problem between procurer and innovator 2 (denoting the negotia-
tion price by P2 and the procurer’s profit by pip2), which maximizes
pip2 P2, subject to the budget constraint pip2+ P2 ≤ x2, which yields
pip2 = 12 x2.
13The assumed sequence is not essential for the payoff of the procurer. If the
procurer would first bargain with innovator 2, he would acquire the option to
buy the inferior innovation and pay “liquidated damage fees” when that right
is not exercised (as in Diamond and Maskin, 1979), that share the increment
in profit due to having acquired a bargaining chip in dealing with the owner of
superior innovation. As one can easily confirm, the resulting total price paid
by the procurer (including the damage fee) is the same as the above price P ′ in
(2.4).
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Therefore, in the preceding bargaining between procurer and inno-
vator 1, the parties maximize the Nash product (where 12 x2 is the
procurer’s default payoff),
max
pip,P ′
(
pip− 12 x2
)
P ′, s.t. pip+ P ′ ≤ x1 (2.3)
which gives P ′ = 1
2
(
x1− 12 x2
)
. (2.4)
Hence, when both innovators bypassed, the procurer buys the supe-
rior innovation at price P ′, while innovator 2 receives nothing. Note
that the possibility to trade with innovator 2 confers an advantage
to the procurer as it allows him to reduce the price of the superior
innovation.
As an alternative to bargaining in the event when both innovators
bypass, the procurer may also consider to let the two innovators
compete in Bertrand fashion, by running a Vickrey auction in which
bids are profits promised to the procurer. Evidently, if both inno-
vators participate in that auction, the procurer obtains the superior
innovation at a price equal to x1− x2, which gives him a payoff equal
to x2. Yet, if only one innovator participates, the procurer obtains
that innovator’s innovation for a price equal to its full value, X .
However, consistent with our assumptions, one must take into ac-
count that the procurer cannot commit to never bargain with innova-
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tors who bypass this Bertrand competition game. But this implies, as
we show now, that the Bertrand is never profitable for the procurer
and shall not be considered by him.
Note, Bertrand competition is never profitable for the procurer if
one innovator bypasses it; and if no innovator bypasses, Bertrand
competition is more profitable for the procurer than bargaining if
and only if x2 > x1− P ′. However, innovator 1 participates in the
Bertrand competition if and only if he earns more than from bar-
gaining, i.e., x1− x2 > P ′. Hence, Bertrand competition is never a
profitable alternative.
Timeline: At date 0, the procurer announces the contest rule. At
date 1, innovators simultaneously register for the contest and pay an
entry fee or do not register (bypass may already occur at this point),
if registration is required. At date 2, innovators simultaneously
draw an innovation (or one or both do not innovate), not knowing
whether their rival has registered for the contest. At date 3, innovators
privately observe their innovation and either submit it to the contest
or bypass. If the contest is an auction, submission requires a financial
bid. If at least one innovation was submitted, at date 4 the mechanism
game is executed, the winner/loser is selected and the winner is paid.
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If an innovator has bypassed the mechanism, at date 5, this innovator
proposes bargaining, and the procurer bargains with him if and only
if he has drawn the superior innovation.
Parameter restrictions: We assume that the procurer is subject
to a sufficiently high loss in the event that no procurement takes
place. This is the case when the support of the random innovation is
sufficiently bounded away from zero, so that x > 0.14 Normalizing
that support of X to [0,1] then means that a zero profit from no
procurement is transformed into a negative profit of no procurement,
equal to −x . That loss is taken to be so high that one considers only
mechanisms that assure procurement with probability one.
We also assume that the expected social surplus from two inno-
vation draws exceeds that from one draw, that the surplus from
one draw is positive, E[X(1)]−2c > E[X ]− c > 0 (or equivalently
c ≤ 1/2E [X(1)− X(2)]), and that procuring an innovations does not
require subsidies.
14This is typically the case when the procurement concerns some bottleneck inno-
vation.
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2.3. Baseline optimal mechanisms
As a baseline, we first assume that the procurer can commit to never
negotiate with innovators who bypass the mechanism. We consider
a standard fixed-prize tournament where the procurer offers to pay a
fixed prize p for the best submitted innovation, and a scoring auction
described by a scoring rule, a pricing rule, and entry fee f . As it
will become clear, under full commitment entry fees are essential
for surplus extraction in auctions but play no role in fixed-prize
tournaments.
Baseline fixed-prize tournament The tournament game has a
unique equilibrium outcome: the procurer sets the smallest prize
that assures that both innovators innovate and submit their innova-
tion (see Taylor, 1995). The equilibrium prize, p∗, and equilibrium
payoffs of procurer, pi∗p , and innovators, pi
∗, are
p∗ = 2c, pi∗p = E[X(1)]− p∗ = E[X(1)]−2c, pi∗ =
1
2
p∗− c = 0.
(2.5)
Note, if the procurer would set a smaller prize, p ∈ [c,2c), innovators
would play mixed strategies. Given our assumption concerning the
cost of “no procurement”, the procurer will never set a price that
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induces mixed strategies since this would involve that procurement
fails with positive probability.
Also, note that the optimal tournament is efficient and allows the
procurer to extract the entire surplus.
Baseline Scoring Auction In a scoring auction, bids are two-
dimensional, (xi ,bi ); where xi is the value of the innovation, and bi
the minimum price requested. Bids are scored by a non-discriminatory
scoring rule Si (xi ,bi ) := xi−bi that ranks innovations by their value-
added for the procurer. The highest scoring bid wins. In the first-
score auction the winner receives the price he requested; in the
second-score auction the winner receives the price that makes his
score match the second highest score.
The second-score auction is not incentive compatible if the value of
innovations is not verifiable to third parties. Therefore, we assume
that the procurer adopts a first-score auction. However, as we show
in appendix 2.A.1):
Lemma 2.1. First- and second-score auctions are payoff equiva-
lent.
Therefore, we can view the second-score auction as a proxy for the
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first-score auction. This allows us to highlight the performance of
auctions without getting entangled in unnecessarily complex bidding
strategies.15
At the time of bidding, the cost of innovation, c, is already sunk.
Therefore, in the second-score auction, it is an equilibrium in dom-
inant strategies to bid a score equal to the value of the innovation,
xi .16 The associated equilibrium price, P , then solves the equation
X(1)− P = S(2) = X(2), which gives P = X(1)− X(2).
In the optimal second-score auction, the procurer levies an entry
fee, f , which bidders have to pay in advance to register for the
auction, before they draw their innovation. Only registered bidders
can participate in the auction.17
The equilibrium expected price, entry fee, and payoffs are
E[P]= E [X(1)− X(2)] (expected price) (2.6)
15We mention that the payoff-equivalence of first- and second-score auctions does
not apply to models in which bidders choose effort and price as in Che and Gale
(2003), Scho¨ttner (2008).
16To prove this, note that bidding a higher score can only change something if
xi < x j , in which case the price becomes negative. Similarly, one can show that
it never pays to bid a lower score.
17In procurement this corresponds to the commonly employed short-listing proce-
dure.
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f ∗ = 1
2
E[X(1)− X(2)]− c (entry fee) (2.7)
pip = E[X(1)]− E[P]+2 f = E[X(1)]−2c = pi∗p (2.8)
pi = 1
2
E[X(1)− X(2)]− c− f = 0= pi∗. (2.9)
Obviously,
Proposition 2.1. Under perfect commitment the two mechanisms
are payoff equivalent and allow the procurer to extract the entire
surplus.
Whereas the optimal auction achieves full surplus extraction only by
charging entry fees, the optimal fixed-prize tournament requires no
entry fees. This fact plays a pivotal role in our later analysis.
2.4. Auction vs. fixed-prize tournament under
imperfect commitment
Now assume the procurer cannot commit to never trade with an inno-
vator who did not participate in the contest. In that case, innovators
may bypass the contest and engage in bargaining after the contest
game has been played.
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A bypass can occur in two ways: either the innovator does not
register for the contest, yet innovates and engages in bargaining after
the contest game has been played, or he registers for the contest,
draws an innovation but then abstains from bidding and engages in
bargaining. Of course, an innovator can always not register and not
innovate, to which we refer as quit.
The auction is characterized by the entry fee f and the fixed prize
contest by the fixed prize and the entry fee, (p, f ). Since tourna-
ments do not necessarily require registration and entry fees (a case
in point is the above benchmark optimal tournament), a “simple
fixed-prize tournament” will be referred to as a tournament without
registration requirement, which is defined by p (without f ).
2.4.1. Optimal auction
Innovators’ play a simultaneous moves game where they choose
among the following action profiles: 1) register, innovate, bid, in
short: register, bid, 2) register, innovate, not bid (bargain), in short:
register, bargain, 3) not register, innovate, bargain, in short: not
register, bargain, and 4) quit.
We show, in a sequence of lemmas, that the optimal entry fee induces
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both innovators to register, innovate, and bid, so that in equilibrium
no bypass ever occurs. The only effect of imperfect commitment is
that the procurer lowers the entry fee below the rate that is optimal
under full commitment,18 and in this way suffers from the lack of
commitment.19
In a first step we show that bypass in the form of not submitting a
bid after having registered, which is the above action profile 2), can
be ruled out by elimination of dominated strategies:
Lemma 2.2. If an innovator has registered for the auction, partici-
pation in the auction strictly dominates bypass.
Proof. Consider an innovator who registered for the auction and
drew the innovation x > 0. Suppose the other innovator also regis-
tered for the auction and bids. Then, the innovator’s payoff from
bidding, pi , is greater than that from bargaining (bypass), pi ′, since
pi(x)=
∫ x
0
(x− y)g(y)dy >
∫ x
0
1
2
(x− y)g(y)dy = pi ′(x).
18The restriction imposed on entry fees by the possibility of bypass is similar to
the restriction based on listing fees due to search costs in auction hosting site
pricing (see Deltas and Jeitschko, 2007).
19As we show later, in section 2.6, the profitability of the auction cannot be
increased by adopting a minimum score requirement.
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Next, suppose the other innovator does not bid (either because he
registered and did not bid or did not register). Then, participation is
even more profitable than bypass, since being the only bidder yields
a price for the innovation equal to the full value of the innovation x .
Therefore, conditional upon registration, participation in the auction
is the dominant strategy.
We can thus reduce innovators’ strategies to: register (r) (short for
register and innovate and bid), not register (n) (short for not register
and innovate and bargain), and quit (q) (short for not register and
not innovate). Table 2.1 summarizes the payoffs of innovator 1 for
all combinations of innovators’ strategies.
Innovator 2
register (r) not register (n) quit (q)
r 12 E[X(1)− X(2)]− c− f E[X ]− c− f E[X ]− c− f
n 12
1
2 E[X(1)− X(2)]− c 12 12 E[X(1)− 12 X(2)]− c 12 E[X ]− c
In
no
va
to
r1
q 0 0 0
Table 2.1.: (Reduced form) entry game in the auction
Denote innovators’ payoff function by pi(·, ·) where the first entry in
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the strategy profile refers to the own strategy and the second to that
of the rival innovator. And define
f ∗∗ := sup{ f | pi(r,r)≥ pi(n,r)} = 1
4
E
[
X(1)− X(2)
]
(2.10)
f ∗ := sup{ f | pi(r,r)≥ pi(q,r)} = 1
2
E
[
X(1)− X(2)
]− c. (2.11)
Lemma 2.3. (r,r) is the unique equilibrium of the entry game that
survives elimination of dominated strategies if and only if f ≤ min
{ f ∗∗, f ∗}.
Proof. 1) The proof of necessity is trivial.
2) To prove sufficiency, suppose f ≤min{ f ∗∗, f ∗}. Then, obviously,
“register” is a best reply to “register” and, as we show in Appendix
2.A.2, “register” is the unique best reply to “not register” and to
“quit”. Therefore, “register” is a dominant strategy.
Lemma 2.4. The procurer’s expected profit is maximized if he sets
f =min{ f ∗∗, f ∗}.
Proof. If f > min{ f ∗∗, f ∗}, the strategy profile (r,r) is no longer
an equilibrium since either q or n is the best reply to r (see Table
2.1). In that case, the game played between innovators has either one
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of the following equilibrium strategy profiles: (q,q), (r,n), (n,n),
(n,q), (r,q) (plus the asymmetric equilibria obtained by renaming
players) or, for that matter, no (pure strategy) equilibrium. In either
case, the procurer’s expected profit is lower than piap , as we show
in Appendix 2.A.3. Of course, setting f < min{ f ∗∗, f ∗} is never
profitable for the procurer.
Proposition 2.2 (Optimal auction). The optimal auction involves
the entry fee f =min{ f ∗∗, f ∗}. It induces all innovators to register,
innovate, and bid, and earns the procurer a positive expected profit
equal to:
piap =

E[X ] if c ≤ c¯
E[X(1)]−2c if c ≥ c¯.
(2.12)
where c¯ is the cost level at which f ∗ is equal to f ∗∗:
c¯ := 1
4
E[X(1)− X(2)]. (2.13)
Proof. The optimality of f =min{ f ∗∗, f ∗} follows from the above
lemmas. To compute the associated expected profit of the procurer,
note that if c ≤ c¯, one has f = f ∗∗ and pip = E[X(1)]− E[X(1)−
X(2)]+ 2 f = 12 E[X(1)+ X(2)] = E[X ]. Whereas if c ≥ c¯, one has
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f = f ∗ and pip = E[X(1)]− E[X(1)− X(2)]+ 2 f = E[X(1)]− 2c.
Corollary 2.1. Pure bargaining (obtained by inducing (n,n) as
equilibrium of the entry game) is strictly less profitable for the pro-
curer than the optimal auction.
Corollary 2.2. Imperfect commitment does not affect payoffs if c ≥
c¯, yet reduces the procurer’s payoff from E[X(1)]−2c to E[X ], leav-
ing the surplus 1/4E[X(1)− X(2)]−c> 0 to each innovator, if c< c¯.
Altogether, the procurer who adopts an auction faces a dilemma:
in order to extract surplus he must rely on high entry fees, even if
bypass is not an issue (see (2.7)); however, high entry fees make
bypass profitable. As a rule, the optimal auction under imperfect
commitment requires the procurer to set a sufficiently low entry fee
that deters bypass. The difference between the surplus extracting
and the bypass preventing entry fee measures the cost of imperfect
commitment to the procurer.
There is one exception to this rule: If the cost of innovation is
sufficiently high, specifically iff c ≥ c¯, the surplus extracting entry
fee is already so low that innovators gain more from participating in
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the auction than from avoiding the entry fee by bypassing. In that
case, the optimal baseline auction is also optimal under imperfect
commitment.
2.4.2. Fixed-prize tournament
Innovators play a simultaneous moves game where they choose
among the same action profiles as in the above auction, provided one
substitutes bid by submit.
Innovators’ equilibrium play is determined by the procurer’s choice
of prize and, if registration is required, an entry fee, (p, f ). The prize
p determines whether an innovator who registered either submits
his innovation regardless of its value or submits it only if its value
is below a certain threshold level, and the registration fee influences
the registration decision.
In a first step we analyze the equilibrium play assuming both innova-
tors have registered or registration is not required.
In the following, “simple fixed-prize tournaments”, in which contes-
tants are not asked to register for the contest (and thus no registration
fee is required) will play a particular role.
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Lemma 2.5. Suppose registration is not required or, if it is required,
both innovators have registered. Then, innovators play cutoff strate-
gies γ1,γ2 ∈ (0,1] and submit their innovation xi if and only if
xi < γi .
Proof. Suppose innovator 2 plays cutoff strategy γ2, and innovator
1 has drawn innovation x1. We need to show that 1) if “not submit”
(ns) is the best reply of innovator 1 to γ2, then ns is also his best
reply for all innovation values greater than x1; and 2) if “submit” (s)
is the best reply of innovator 1, then s is also his best reply for all
innovation values smaller than x1.
To prove 1), suppose x1 < γ2. Then, the assumption pi(ns,γ2) ≥
pi(s,γ2) is equivalent to
1
2
∫ x1
0
(x1− y)dG(y)≥ p (G(x1)+ (1−G(γ2)))
1
2
∫ x1
0
G(y)dy ≥ p (G(x1)+ (1−G(γ2)))
1
2
H(x1)
H ′(x1)
≥ p
(
1+ 1−G(γ2)
G(x1)
)
.
Since H is log-concave, the LHS of the last inequality is increasing
and the RHS is decreasing in x1. Therefore, this inequality holds
also for all innovations valued higher than x1.
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Suppose x1 >γ2. Then, the assumption pi(ns,γ2)≥ pi(s,γ2) is equiv-
alent to
1
2
∫ γ2
0
(x1− y)dG(y)+ 12
∫ x1
γ2
(
x1− 12 y
)
dG(y)≥ p.
The LHS of the last inequality is increasing in x1 and the RHS is
constant. Therefore, this inequality holds also for all innovations
valued higher than x1.
The proof of 2) is similar and hence omitted.
Lemma 2.6. Suppose registration is not required or, if it is required,
both innovators have registered. Then, the game has a unique sym-
metric equilibrium cutoff strategy γ (p) ∈ (0,1]. γ (p) is monotone
increasing in p and exhibits γ = 1 (always submit) if and only if
p ≥max{ p¯,2c}, where
p¯ := 1
2
∫ 1
0
G(x)dx = 1
2
(1− E[X ]). (2.14)
Proof. 1) γ (p) = 1 is a symmetric equilibrium if and only if p is
such that for all x :
pi(s, s)≥ pi(ns, s )
G(x)p ≥ G(x)E[1/2(x−Y ) | Y < x]
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p ≥ 1
2
∫ x
0
G(y)
G(x)
dy = 1
2
H(x)
H ′(x)
.
Recall that H(x) := ∫ x0 G(y)dy is log-concave; hence, H(x)/H ′(x)
is increasing, and thus,
p¯ := inf
{
p | p ≥ 1
2
H(x)
H ′(x)
,∀x
}
= 1
2
H(1)
G(1)
= 1
2
(1− E[X ]).
Therefore, γ = 1 for all p ≥max{ p¯,2c}, which is the smallest prize
that induces γ (p)= 1 (2c enters to assure that pi(s,s)≥ 0, for all x).
2) If p < p¯, one obtains γ (p) ∈ (0,1) and p′ > p⇒ γ (p′) > γ (p).
Since this property is not essential for our analysis, we relegate the
proof to Chapter 3.
This result has an intuitive interpretation. Suppose an innovator
has drawn the best possible innovation X = 1. Then, he expects
to be paid 12 (1− E[Y | Y < 1])= 12 (1− E[X ]) if he chooses to by-
pass the tournament. Therefore, any p ≥ 12 (1− E[X ]) = p¯ will
keep him in the tournament if the other innovator is in, and, due
to the monotonicity of 12 (x− E[Y < x]) in x , this extends to all
innovations x . It follows that if the conditional expected spread
E[X(1)− X(2) | X(1) = 1]= 1− E[X ] is small, bypass is deterred in
the tournament already at a relatively low prize.
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We now construct a fixed-prize tournament ( pˆ, fˆ ) that achieves the
same expected profit of the procurer as the optimal auction. That
particular tournament involves a prize pˆ that is higher than p¯. While
p¯ is the smallest prize that makes γ = 1 (submit all innovations)
an equilibrium if both innovators registered (or no registration is re-
quired), pˆ (together with fˆ ) makes γ = 1 an equilibrium in dominant
strategy, independent of whether the rival innovator registered.
Proposition 2.3. The fixed-prize tournament ( pˆ, fˆ ),
pˆ = 1
2
− 1
4
E[X ] (2.15)
fˆ =

1
4 − 116
(
5E[X(1)]−3E[X(2)]
)
if c ≤ c¯
1
4 − 18 E[X ]− c if c ≥ c¯.
(2.16)
achieves the same expected profit for the procurer as the optimal
auction. Therefore, the optimal fixed-prize tournament is at least as
profitable for the procurer as the optimal auction.
The following Lemmas prove the above interpretation of pˆ and
prepare the proof of proposition 2.3.
Lemma 2.7. At the fixed-prize contest ( pˆ, fˆ ) “quit” is a strictly
dominated strategy.
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Proof. “Quit” yields a payoff equal to zero. Consider the simple
alternative strategy “register (if required) and always submit”. If
this strategy is played, the worst that can happen is that the rival
plays the same strategy, in which case one collects the prize pˆ if
and only if one has the best innovation, yielding a payoff equal to
1/2 pˆ− fˆ − c, which is positive regardless of whether c < c¯ or c > c¯.
This is the worst case, because if the rival plays any other strategy
and does not submit all his innovations, the own payoff can only be
higher. It follows that the equilibrium payoff is bounded away from
zero; hence, the strategy “quit” that yields a payoff equal to zero is
strictly dominated. This allows us to eliminate “quit” from further
consideration.
Lemma 2.8. Consider an innovator who has registered or who is
not required to register. γ = 1 is that innovators dominant strategy
if and only if p ≥ pˆ.
Proof. We have already eliminated “quit”; therefore, the innovator
will either “submit” (s) or “not submit” (ns). First, suppose that the
rival innovator did not register. Then, our innovator submits if and
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only if 1(p, x)≥ 0, for all x :
1(p, x) := pi(s,n)−pi(ns,n)
= p−G(x)E
[
1
2
(x− 1
2
Y ) | Y < x
]
= p− 1
2
∫ x
0
(x− 1
2
y)g(y)dy
= p− 1
4
xG(x)− 1
4
∫ x
0
G(y)dy.
(2.17)
Evidently, 1(p, x) is strictly increasing in p and decreasing in x ,
and one has
1(p, x)|p= pˆ,x=1 = pˆ−
1
4
− 1
4
∫ 1
0
G(y)dy = pˆ− 1
2
+ 1
4
E[X ]= 0.
1(p, x)|p= p¯,x=1 =
1
4
(∫ 1
0
G(y)dy−1
)
<
1
4
(∫ 1
0
dy−1
)
= 0
Therefore, pˆ is the smallest prize that assures 1(p, x)≥ 0, for all x ,
and p¯ < pˆ, since 1( p¯, x) < 0 for high values of x .
Second, suppose the rival innovator is also registered. Recall that
p = p¯ is the smallest prize that assures 1(p, x)≥ 0 for all x , if both
innovators registered. Since pˆ > p¯ it follows that p = pˆ also assures
that the innovator submits.
We are now ready to prove Proposition 2.3.
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Proof. By construction of pˆ, an innovator who registered plays γ = 1
and “quit” is a dominated strategy. Therefore, the simultaneous entry
game can be described by the following reduced payoff matrix (since
the game is symmetric we list only the payoffs of innovator 1):20
Innovator 2
register (r) not register (n)
r 12 pˆ− f − c pˆ− c− f
n 12
(
1
2 E
[
X(1)− X(2)
])− c 12 ( 12 E [X(1)− 12 X(2)])− c
In
no
va
to
r1
Table 2.2.: (Reduced form) entry game in the fixed-prize tournament
with entry fees
Suppose c ≤ c¯ = 1/4E[X(1)− X(2)]. Then, for f = fˆ one has
pi(r,r)= 1
2
pˆ− fˆ − c = 1
2
(
1
2
E
[
X(1)− X(2)
])− c = pi(n,r)
20Suppose innovator 1 plays r ; if innovator 2 plays n, 1 wins the prize for sure,
whereas if 2 plays also r , 1 wins the prize with probability 1/2. Suppose
innovator 1 plays n and thus speculates on bargaining; he wins only if he
has the better innovation, which occurs with probability 1/2, and in that event
the procurer’s threat point depends on whether innovator 2 played r or n, as
explained before.
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pi(r,n)= pˆ− fˆ − c
>
1
2
pˆ− fˆ − c
= 1
2
(
1
2
E
[
X(1)− 12 X(2)
])
− c = pi(n,n),
Therefore, r dominates n. Hence, (r,r) is the unique equilibrium
of the entry game, by iterated elimination of dominated strategies,
and the procurer’s equilibrium expected profit is pi tp = E[X(1)]− pˆ+
2 fˆ = E[X ]= piap .
Similarly, in case c ≥ c¯ one has
pi(r,r)= 1
2
pˆ− fˆ − c = 0≥ 1
2
(
1
2
E
[
X(1)− X(2)
])− c = pi(n,r)
pi(r,n)= pˆ− fˆ − c > 1
2
(
1
2
E
[
X(1)− 12 X(2)
])
− c = pi(n,n).
Again, (r,r) is the unique equilibrium and the procurer’s equilibrium
expected profit is pi tp = E[X(1)]− pˆ+ 2 fˆ = E[X(1)]− 2c = piap in
this case.
2.5. Superiority of the fixed-prize tournament
Having shown that the optimal fixed-prize tournament is at least as
profitable as the optimal auction, we now provide sufficient condi-
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tions for the strict superiority of the fixed-prize tournament. Interest-
ingly, in these cases a “simple fixed-prize tournament”, that does not
require registration and entry fees, is more profitable than the optimal
auction. Of course, a simple fixed-prize tournament is strategically
simpler since it poses no entry decision and innovators maintain the
option to submit until they have drawn their innovation.
Proposition 2.4. The optimal fixed-prize tournament is strictly more
profitable than the optimal auction if c < c¯ and
η := E
[
3
2
X(1)− 12 X(2)
]
> 1. (2.18)
Proof. We show that the “simple fixed-prize tournament” p=max{ p¯,2c},
that does not require registration and includes no entry fee f , is more
profitable than the optimal auction. By lemma 2.6, max{ p¯,2c} is the
smallest prize for which (γ1,γ2)= (1,1) as an equilibrium.
The assumption c < c¯ implies piap = E[X ] (by proposition 2.2). The
assumption η > 1 implies that p¯ < 2c¯. We distinguish between the
cases when c ∈ ( p¯2 , c¯) and c < p¯2 .
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1) Suppose c ∈ ( p¯2 , c¯). Then, max{ p¯,2c} = 2c, and one has,
pi tp−piap ≥ pi tp
∣∣
p=2c−piap
= E[X(1)]−2c− E[X ]
> E[X(1)]−2c¯− E[X ]
= E[X(1)]− 12
(
E[X(1)]− E[X(2)]
)− E[X ]= 0.
(2.19)
2) Suppose c < 12 p¯. Then, max{ p¯,2c} = p¯, and one has,
pi tp−piap ≥ pi tp
∣∣
p= p¯−piap
= E[X(1)]− p¯− E[X ]
= 1
2
(
3
2
E[X(1)]− 12 E[X(2)]−1
)
= 1
2
(
η−1
)
> 0.
(2.20)
Combining propositions 2.4 and 2.3 it follows immediately:
Corollary 2.3 (Optimality of the fixed-prize tournament). The
optimal fixed-prize tournament is never less and sometimes more
profitable than the optimal auction.
58 Procurement of Innovation under Imperfect Commitment
These results indicate that the optimal fixed-prize tournament is
strictly superior to the optimal auction if the spread between the
order statistics X(1), X(2) is relatively large (so that η > 1), and the
cost of innovation c is lower than c¯.
In the auction, a large spread between the order statistics induces a
high equilibrium price for the best innovation. In that case, surplus
extraction requires high entry fees. However, high entry fees make
bypass attractive. Therefore, the procurer can only deter bypass by
significantly reducing the entry fees, which reduces his expected
profit. This reflects in the “loss of imperfect commitment”:
1a = pi∗p− E[X ]=
1
2
E[X(1)− X(2)]−2c. (2.21)
In other words, the optimal auction performs well only if the expected
spread E[X(1)− X(2)] is small.
Whereas in the auction the bypass decision is made at the entry stage,
in the tournament the key bypass decision is made after innovators
have drawn their innovations.
In the tournament, the benefit to bypass depends on innovators’
marginal contribution to the surplus, conditional on having the best
innovation. If the conditional expected spread E[X(1)− X(2) | X(1) =
1]= 1− E[X ] is small, bypass is deterred in the tournament already
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at a relatively low prize, and thus full surplus extraction can be
possible, even if it is impossible in the optimal auction. This prop-
erty reflects in the “loss of imperfect commitment” in the optimal
tournament, defined as (in the case c ≤ p¯2 ),
1t ≤ pi∗p− pi tp
∣∣
p= p¯ =
1
2
(1− E[X ])−2c. (2.22)
As one can see from (2.22), the loss of imperfect commitment in
the tournament, 1t , is small if the probability distribution exhibits a
concentration on high values, so that E[X ] is relatively large. And
the loss of imperfect commitment in the auction, 1a , is large if the
unconditional expected spread between the order statistics is large.
Example 2.1. Consider the Kumaraswamy (1980) distribution G(x)
= 1− (1− (x/γ)α)β , with parameter values α = 1,β = 1/5, which
exhibits a concentration on high values.21 Then, η = 15/14 > 1, c¯ =
5/84, p¯= 1/12, and for all c≤ 124 : pi tp ≥ pi tp
∣∣
p= p¯ = 73/84> 5/6= piap . As
one can easily confirm, this distribution satisfies the log-concavity
of H(x) = ∫ x0 G(y)dy, for all x, which we assumed in the present
chapter. Therefore, this is an example for the strict superiority of
the optimal fixed-prize tournament.
21This distribution has been introduced as a more convenient alternative to the Beta
distribution.
60 Procurement of Innovation under Imperfect Commitment
2.6. The auction cannot be improved by a
minimum score
One may think that the profitability of the auction can be improved
by adding a minimum score requirement, similar to the standard
optimal auction problem where the seller benefits from strategically
setting a binding reserve price above his own valuation.22
However, as we show formally in the technical supplement (Chapter
3), the auction cannot be improved by adding a minimum score.
Proposition 2.5. The optimal minimum score is equal to zero; hence,
the procurer cannot raise his expected profit by employing a mini-
mum score requirement in addition to charging entry fees.
The proof is in the technical supplement contained in Chapter 3.
Intuitively this is due to the fact that the optimal auction already
uses an entry fee. And using an entry fee is more profitable than a
minimum score requirement because the entry fee is collected at the
time when innovators are still behind a “veil of ignorance”.
22Myerson (1981) showed that a binding reserve price that excludes participation
of bidders with low values is optimal for the seller except if buyers’ valuations
are considerably larger than the seller’s own valuation.
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2.7. Discussion
In the present chapter we analyze the procurement of innovations,
assuming that the procurer cannot commit himself to never bargain
with innovators who did not participate in the mechanism of his
choice. We compare two methods of procurement: auctions and
fixed-prize tournaments, and show that the optimal fixed-prize tour-
nament is more profitable than the optimal auction. While auctions
are never attractive without positive entry fees, a standard fixed-prize
contest that does not require registration and thus does not include
entry fees can be more profitable than the optimal auction.
Our analysis assumes that the value of an innovation is not verifi-
able to third parties. This excludes the use of contracts to procure
innovations. It also precludes the use of a discriminatory scoring
rule as well as a second-score auction in which the price paid by the
procurer depends on the difference between the values of the two
best innovations. Nevertheless, since in the present framework first-
and second-score auctions are revenue equivalent, we are able to
highlight the performance of auctions without getting entangled in
unnecessarily complex bidding strategies, by using the second-score
auction as a proxy for the first-score auction,
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Our analysis has been carried out in a simple framework, with only
two contestants and a stylized innovation technology. In further
research one may wish to extend the analysis to cases in which it is
optimal to short-list more than two contestants, introduce asymme-
tries between innovators, either with respect to their cost functions
or with respect to the probability distributions from which they draw
their innovations, and extend the analysis to a common (or affiliated)
value framework.
2.A. Appendix
2.A.1. Proof of Lemma 2.1
We show that first- and second-score auctions yield the same ex-
pected prices, p1, p2.
Denote the bidding strategy of the first-score auction by the score
function s(x). The highest score wins and the winner is paid b(x) :=
x− s(x). By an argument similar to the solution of a standard first-
price auction, one finds the equilibrium score function is s(x) =
E[Y | Y ≤ x].
Since the innovator with the highest x has also the highest score,
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the winning score is s(X(1)), and the equilibrium price paid by the
procurer to the winner is X(1)− s(X(1)). Therefore, one finds, using
the density of the order statistic X(1), g(1)(x) = 2G(x)g(x), p1 =
E[X(1)− s(X(1))]= E[X(1)]−
∫ 1
0
∫ x
0 2yg(y)dyg(x)dx .
Rearrange p2 in (2.6), using the joint density of the two order statis-
tics g(1,2)(x, y) = 2g(x)g(y) for x > y, and one concludes by the
law of iterated expectations:
p2 = E[X(1)]− E[X(2)]
= E[X(1)]− E[E[X(2) | X(1)]]
= E[X(1)]−
∫ 1
0
∫ x
0
y
g(1,2)(x, y)
g(1)(x)
dyg(1)(x)dx
= E[X(1)]−
∫ 1
0
∫ x
0
2yg(y)dyg(x)dx = p1.
2.A.2. Supplement to the proof of Lemma 2.3
Here we show that “register” (r) is the unique best reply to “not
register” (n) and to “quit” (q). We denote the payoff function of
innovator 1 by pi(·, ·) where the first entry in the strategy profile
refers to strategy of innovator 1 and the second to that of innovator 2.
1) Let c ≤ c¯. Then, f ≤ min{ f ∗∗, f ∗} = f ∗∗, and one finds, using
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Table 2.1,
pi(r,n)= E[X ]− f − c
≥ 1
2
E
[
X(1)+ X(2)
]− 1
4
E
[
X(1)− X(2)
]− c
= 1
4
E[X(1)]+ 34 E[X(2)]− c > 0= pi(q,n)
pi(r,n) >
1
4
E[X(1)]− 18 E[X(2)]− c = pi(n,n).
Therefore, r is the unique best reply to n in this case.
2) Let c ≥ c¯, then f ≤min{ f ∗∗, f ∗} = f ∗, and hence
pi(r,n)≥ E[X ]− c−
(
1
2
E[X(1)− X(2)]− c
)
= 1
2
E[X(1)+ X(2)]= E[X ]> 0= pi(q,n),
pi(n,n)= 1
4
E[X(1)]− 18 E[X(2)]− c
≤ 1
4
E[X(1)]− 18 E[X(2)]−
1
4
E[X(1)]+ 14 E[X(2)]
= 1
8
E[X(2)]< pi(r,n).
Therefore, r is the unique best reply to n also in this case.
3) Similarly one can show that r is the unique best reply to q .
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2.A.3. Proof of Lemma 2.4
1) Inducing an equilibrium (q,q), where no one innovates, yields
zero profit to the procurer, whereas inducing (r,r) yields piap > 0 (see
(2.12)).
2) If (r,n) is induced, one has pi(r,n)≥ pi(n,n), which is equivalent
to
f ≤ 1
4
E[X(1)]+ 58 E[X(2)]. (2.23)
In such an equilibrium the procurer’s expected profit is
pip = E[X(1)]− E[X ]+ f − 12
(
1
2
E[X(1)− 12 X(2)]
)
= 1
4
E[X(1)]− 38 E[X(2)]+ f.
If c ≤ c¯, it follows by (2.23) and (2.12) that
pip ≤ 14 E[X(1)]−
3
8
E[X(2)]+ 14 E[X(1)]+
5
8
E[X(2)]
= 1
2
E[X(1)]+ 14 E[X(2)]< E[X ]= pi
a
p .
(2.24)
And if c¯ ≤ c ≤ 14 E[X(1)]− 18 E[X(2)], it follows by (2.23) and (2.12)
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that
piap = E[X(1)]−2c
≥ E[X(1)]−2
(
1
4
E[X(1)]− 18 E[X(2)]
)
= 1
2
E[X(1)]+ 14 E[X(2)]
≥ 1
4
E[X(1)]− 38 E[X(2)]+ f = pip.
(2.25)
3) If (n,n) is induced, the payoffs of innovators’ and the procurer
are
pi(n,n)= 1
2
(
1
2
E[X(1)− 12 X(2)]
)
− c = 1
4
E[X(1)]− 18 E[X(2)]− c ≥ 0
pip = E[X(1)]− 12 E[X(1)−
1
2
X(2)]= 12 E[X(1)]+
1
4
E[X(2)].
Hence, one must have c ≤ 1/4E[X(1)]− 1/8E[X(2)].
If c ≤ c¯, one finds piap = E[X ]= 12 E[X(1)+ X(2)]> pip.
And if c¯ ≤ c ≤ 1/4E[X(1)]− 1/8E[X(2)], one has
piap = E[X(1)]−2c ≥ E[X(1)]−
1
2
E[X(1)]+ 14 E[X(2)]
= 1
2
E[X(1)]+ 14 E[X(2)]= pip.
4) Inducing (n,q) is less profitable for the procurer than inducing
(n,n), since bargaining with two innovators is obviously better than
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dealing with one, and this, in turn, is less profitable than inducing
(r,r), as already shown in step 3).
5) (r,q) can only be induced if E[X ]− c− f ≥ 0 (see Table 2.1).
But this implies, together with the assumed efficiency of two draws,
that inducing (r,q) is less profitable for the procurer than inducing
(r,r):
piap −pip =
(
E[X(1)]−2c
)− f
≥ (E[X(1)]−2c)− (E[X ]− c) > 0.

3. Technical Supplement1
3.1. Introduction
In this technical supplement to the previous chapter we provide some
more detailed proofs and add material for the interested reader. In
particular, we provide a more detailed characterization of payoff
functions in fixed-prize tournaments, a characterization of optimal
fixed-prize tournaments, and more results concerning the ranking
of the optimal auction relative to the optimal simple fixed-prize
tournament.
1This chapter is based on Ding and Wolfstetter (2011b).
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3.2. Supplement to the proof of Lemma 2.6
Suppose both innovators have registered or no registration is required.
In Lemmas 2.5 and 2.6 in the previous chapter we showed already
that the game played between innovators has an equilibrium in cutoff
strategies and that innovators submit all innovations if and only if
p ≥ p¯. However, there we did not prove that the cutoff strategy γ is
strictly monotone increasing in p for all p < p¯. Here we we fill in
this gap.
To prepare the proof and solve the symmetric equilibrium cutoff strat-
egy γ , consider one player, say player 1, who contemplates the devi-
ating strategy γ1 ≥ γ , while his rival, player 2, plays the equilibrium
strategy γ . To compute the payoff function of player 1, pi1(γ1,γ ),
take a look at the state space representation of that innovator’s pay-
offs in Figure 3.1. Using the joint density g12(x1, x2)= g(x1)g(x2),
one can then compute the payoff function by integrating over the
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relevant subsets of the state space [0,1]× [0,1]:
pi1(γ1,γ )= p
(∫ γ
0
∫ x1
0
dG(x2)dG(x1)+
∫ γ1
γ
∫ γ
0
dG(x2)dG(x1)
+
∫ γ1
0
∫ 1
γ
dG(x2)dG(x1)
)
+ 1
2
∫ 1
γ1
∫ γ
0
(x1− x2)dG(x2)dG(x1)
+ 1
2
∫ 1
γ1
∫ x1
γ
(
x1− 12 x2
)
dG(x2)dG(x1)− c
(3.1)
1x
2x
γ
1
0
0 1
γ 1
21 4
1
2
1 xx −( )21 xx −2
1
0
P
Figure 3.1.: Payoffs of innovator 1 for γ1 ≥ γ in the state space
[0,1]× [0,1]
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Proposition 3.1. In a tournament with fixed price p, suppose both
innovators have registered or no registration is required and assume
p < p¯. The game played between innovators has a unique symmet-
ric equilibrium strategy γ ∈ (0,1], which is implicitly defined as the
solution of
p = 1
2
∫ γ
0
G(x)dx . (3.2)
γ is strictly increasing in p for all 0< p < p¯.
Proof. Consider one innovator, say innovator 1. We need to show
that for each given p, the γ implicitly defined in Proposition 3.1
satisfies the equilibrium requirement
γ = arg max
0≤γ1≤1
pi1(γ1,γ ). (3.3)
For this purpose, first consider “upward” deviations from the equi-
librium, γ1 ≥ γ , as in (3.1). Computing the partial derivative of pi1
w.r.t. γ1 gives
∂pi1
∂γ1
= p (G(γ )g(γ1)+ (1−G(γ ))g(γ1))
− 1
2
g(γ1)
∫ γ
0
(γ1− x2)dG(x2)
− g(γ1)
∫ γ1
γ
(
1
2
γ1− 14 x2
)
dG(x2)
(3.4)
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∂pi1
∂γ1
∣∣∣∣
γ1=γ
=
(
p− 1
2
∫ γ
0
G(x)dx
)
g(γ )=: ξ(p,γ )g(γ ). (3.5)
Using the Lagrange function L := pi1 + λ(1− γ1), with the La-
grangian λ, and invoking the equilibrium requirement that γ must
be such that the best response of innovator 1 to γ is γ1 = γ (see
(3.3)), the equilibrium strategy γ must solve the Kuhn-Tucker (KT)
conditions
∂L
∂γ1
∣∣∣∣
γ1=γ
= ∂pi1
∂γ1
∣∣∣∣
γ1=γ
−λ= 0
∂L
∂λ
∣∣∣∣
γ1=γ
= 1−γ ≥ 0 and ∂L
∂λ
∣∣∣∣
γ1=γ
λ= 0.
(3.6)
For p ≥ p¯ one finds (omitting the subscript 1) ∂pi/∂γ |γ=1 ≥ 0; hence,
the KT conditions are solved by (γ = 1,λ= ∂pi/∂γ |γ=1). This con-
firms Lemma 2.6.
For 0 < p < p¯ one finds (omitting the subscript 1) ∂pi/∂γ |γ=1 < 0;
hence, the KT conditions are solved by (0< γ < 1,λ= 0), where γ
is implicitly defined as the unique solution of equation (3.2).
A similar argument deals with “downward” deviations, γ1 ≤ γ ; it
yields the same results.
Uniqueness of the solution for p < p¯ follows from the fact that
ξ(p,γ ) is strictly decreasing in γ and that γ = 0⇒ ξ(p,γ )= p> 0
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and γ = 1⇒ ξ(p,γ ) = p− 1/2(1− E[X ]) < 0. Monotonicity of
γ (p) follows easily.
Finally, we show that the unique solution of the condition
∂pi1
∂γ1
∣∣∣∣
γ1=γ
= ξ(p,γ )g(γ )= 0
is indeed a maximizer of the payoff of innovator 1 (assuming inno-
vator 2 also plays the strategy γ ). We prove this by showing that
the function pi1(γ1,γ ) is pseudoconcave in γ1.2 For this purpose,
compute the cross derivative, using (3.4):
∂2
∂γ1∂γ
pi1 = 14γ g(γ1)g(γ )≥ 0.
Together with the monotonicity of ξ(p,γ ) in γ , it follows that
γ1 < γ ⇒ ∂
∂γ1
pi1(γ1,γ )≥ ∂
∂γ1
pi1(γ1,γ1)= ξ(p,γ1)g(γ1)
> ξ(p,γ )g(γ1)= 0
γ1 > γ ⇒ ∂
∂γ1
pi1(γ1,γ )≤ ∂
∂γ1
pi1(γ1,γ1)= ξ(p,γ1)g(γ1)
< ξ(p,γ )g(γ1)= 0.
Therefore, pi1(γ1,γ ) is increasing to the left of its stationary point
(for γ1 < γ ) and decreasing to the right of its stationary point (for
γ1 > γ ). Hence, the stationary point is a global maximum.
2On pseudoconcavity see Avriel, Diewert, Schaible, and Zang (1988, p. 93 ff.).
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3.3. Optimal fixed-prize tournament
In this section we show how one can compute the optimal simple
fixed-prize tournament and illustrate it with an example.
)2()1( 4
1
2
1 xx +
)1(x
)2(xγ
p
xx
−
+
2
)2()1(
1
0
0 1
px −)1(
γ
Figure 3.2.: Payoffs of the procurer in the order statistics space
For this purpose, we compute the procurer’s payoff as a function of
γ , eliminating the variable p. For this task, take a look at Figure 3.2,
where the procurer’s profits are represented in the order statistics
space. The joint p.d.f. of X(1), X(2) is g(1,2)(x, y) = 2g(x)g(y).
Therefore, one obtains, after a bit of rearranging, for all γ ≤ 1 (resp.
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p ≤ p¯):
pip(γ )= 2
∫ γ
0
∫ x
0
(x− p)g(x)g(y)dydx
+2
∫ 1
γ
∫ γ
0
(
x+ y
2
− p
)
g(y)g(x)dydx
+2
∫ 1
γ
∫ x
γ
(
1
2
x+ 1
4
y
)
g(y)g(x)dydx .
(3.7)
Whereas for p ≥ p¯ (resp. γ = 1) one has
pip = E[X(1)]− p. (3.8)
The optimal fixed-prize tournament maximizes the procurer’s ex-
pected profit over γ , resp. p, subject to the constraint that innovators’
equilibrium expected payoff is nonnegative.
Example 3.1. Suppose G(x)≡ x (uniform distribution) and c= 115 .
Then, p¯ = 12
∫ 1
0 ydy = 14 , innovators’ equilibrium strategy is
γ (p)=

2
√
p if p < 1/4
1 if p ≥ 1/4
the procurer’s payoff function, as a function of p, is pip(γ )= 5/12+
γ 2/4− γ 3/2+ γ 4/4, the optimal fixed-prize tournament without regis-
tration is
γ ∗ = arg max
γ
pip(γ )= 1/2, resp. p∗ = 1/16,
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and innovators’ equilibrium payoff is pi∗= 15/128−c≥ 0 (see Figure
3.3).
p
0.55
0.50
0.45
0.40
Optimal Auction/Tournament under Perfect Commitment
Optimal Auction under Imperfect Commitment
p
p
p = 1/16 *p   = 2c
* = 0.5γ
Tournament under Imperfect Commitment
(without entry fees)
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25
π
Figure 3.3.: Comparing the optimal auction with the optimal fixed-
prize tournament (without entry fees), assuming a uni-
form distribution
This example for a uniform distribution (see Example 3.1) is illus-
trated in Figure 3.3. There, the solid curve plots the procurer’s
expected profit in the fixed-prize tournament, as a function of the
prize p. It has a kink at p = p¯ = 1/4 (which is the smallest prize that
prevents bypass). The optimal prize is equal to p = 1/16, which is
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substantially lower than the optimal prize under perfect commitment
(p∗ = 2/15), and the optimal γ is equal to γ ∗ = 1/2. Therefore, in
the optimal fixed-prize tournament, all innovations X > 1/2 bypass
the tournament. Evidently, the lack of perfect commitment hurts the
procurer in the fixed-prize tournament as well as in the auction.
Not surprisingly, the optimal auction performs better in this example,
since a uniform distribution does not satisfy the requirement that
η > 1 for superiority of tournaments stated in Proposition 2.4 from
the last chapter.
3.4. Why the auction cannot be improved by
requiring a minimum score
It has been shown in the theory of auctions that an optimal auction
usually involves either an entry fee or a reserve price, and there
is no benefit of employing both. However, unlike in the standard
optimal auction problem, in our analysis the entry fee is levied
before potential bidders draw their value. Thus, one may think that
the profitability of an auction can be improved by adding a reserve
bid requirement, following an entry fee.
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In a first step we assure that the minimum score does not affect the
existence of an equilibrium in cutoff strategies.
To ensure that the auction has a symmetric equilibrium in cutoff
strategies, we assume that K :=−G is star-shaped, which is weaker
than concavity but stronger than subadditivity of G. The function
K is star-shaped if for each α ∈ [0,1], and all x : K (αx) ≤ αK (x)
(see Bruckner and Ostrow, 1962). star-shapedness implies that K (x)/x
is increasing, resp. G(x)/x is decreasing. This property is used in the
proof below.
Suppose the procurer accepts only bids that match or exceed a stated
minimum score, which is denoted by R. This changes the auction
as follows: if exactly one bidder, say bidder 1, submits a score
S1 = x1− b1 ≥ R, that bidder wins the auction and is paid a price
equal to x1− R (instead of a price equal to x1− x2); if no bidder
submits a score equal to R or more, no trade occurs in the auction;
and if both bidders submit a score S ≥ R, the minimum score does
not bind, and the auction proceeds as before. Of course, if a bidder
does not submit a valid bid, he will try to engage in bargaining, after
the auction.
In the presence of a minimum score requirement, bidders play cutoff
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strategies and bid if and only if the value of their innovation is equal
or greater than a threshold value, which is denoted by r . We look
for a symmetric equilibrium. In such an equilibrium, a bidder with
value x = r must be indifferent between submitting a score S = R
and not bidding, and bidding must be profitable for all x > r , and
unprofitable for all x < r .
Due to symmetry, a bidder with value x = r wins anything only if the
rival’s value is less than r . In other words, this bidder has zero gain
as long as the rival submits (has a value higher than r). Therefore,
indifference between bidding and not bidding for x = r means that
G(r)(r − R)= 1
2
∫ r
0
(r − 1
2
y)g(y)dy.
This implies the following unique and strictly increasing relationship
between the minimum score R and the threshold value r
R = 1
2
r + 1
4
E[X | X ≤ r ], (3.9)
which in turn allows us to eliminate the variable R, compute the
procurer’s expected profit as a function of r , and then maximize that
payoff over r .
Next we prove that the procurer cannot increase his expected profit
by adding a minimum score requirement.
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Proof. Denote the difference between bidders’ payoff when bidding
and not bidding by 1. Assume x > r . Then, using the relationship
between R and r
1= G(r)(x− R)+
∫ x
r
(x− y)g(y)dy− 1
2
∫ r
0
(x− 1
2
y)g(y)dy
− 1
2
∫ x
r
(x− y)g(y)dy
= G(r)(x− R)+ 1
2
∫ x
r
(x− y)g(y)dy− 1
2
∫ r
0
(x− 1
2
y)g(y)dy
= G(r)x−G(r)r + 1
2
∫ r
0
(r − 1
2
y)g(y)dy+ 1
2
∫ x
r
(x− y)g(y)dy
− 1
2
∫ r
0
(x− 1
2
y)g(y)dy
= G(r)(x− r)+ 1
2
∫ r
0
(r − x)g(y)dy+ 1
2
∫ x
r
(x− y)g(y)dy
= G(r)(x− r)+ 1
2
(r − x)G(r)+ 1
2
∫ x
r
(x− y)g(y)dy
= 1
2
G(r)(x− r)+ 1
2
∫ x
r
(x− y)g(y)dy
> 0.
Similarly, one obtains for x ≤ r :3
1= G(r)(x− R)− 1
2
∫ x
0
(x− 1
2
y)g(y)dy
3Note, for some interval of x values below r one has nevertheless x > R.
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= G(r)x−G(r)r + 1
2
∫ r
0
(r − 1
2
y)g(y)dy− 1
2
∫ x
0
(x− 1
2
y)g(y)dy
= G(r)(x− r)+ 1
2
rG(r)− 1
2
xG(x)− 1
4
∫ r
x
yg(y)dy
≤ G(r)(x− r)+ 1
2
rG(r)− 1
2
xG(x)− 1
4
∫ r
x
xg(y)dy
= G(r)(x− r)+ 1
2
rG(r)− 1
2
xG(x)− 1
4
x(G(r)−G(x))
= 3
4
xG(r)− 1
4
xG(x)− 1
2
rG(r)
≤ 1
2
xG(r)− 1
4
xG(x)− 1
2
rG(r)+ 1
4
rG(x)
=
(
G(r)− 1
2
G(x)
)(
1
2
x− 1
2
r
)
< 0,
where we used the fact that −G is star-shaped and thus G(x)x > G(r)r .
The addition of a minimum score implies restrictions on the entry fee.
For a given r the procurer sets the highest entry fee that ensures that
both innovators register. Consider an innovator whose rival registers.
Denote his payoff if he also registers by pi r and if he does not register
by pin . Then, the procurer sets the highest fee that ensures pi r ≥ pin
and pi r ≥ 0.
After some rearranging and changing the order of integration one
finds
pi r = 1
2
∫ r
0
∫ x
0
(x− 1
2
y)g(x)g(y)dydx
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+
∫ 1
r
∫ x
r
(x− y)g(x)g(y)dydx
+
∫ 1
r
∫ r
0
(x− R)g(x)g(y)dydx− f − c
pin = 1
2
∫ r
0
∫ 1
y
(x− 1
2
y)g(x)g(y)dxdy
+ 1
2
∫ 1
r
∫ 1
y
(x− y)g(x)g(y)dxdy− c.
The highest entry fee, f ∗∗, that ensures pi r ≥ pin is
f ∗∗ :=
∫ 1
r
∫ x
r
(
1
2
x− 1
2
y)g(x)g(y)dydx
+
∫ 1
r
∫ r
0
(
1
2
x− 1
4
y− R)g(x)g(y)dydx .
And the highest entry fee, f ∗, that ensures pi r ≥ 0 is
f ∗ := 1
2
∫ r
0
∫ x
0
(x− 1
2
y)g(x)g(y)dydx
+
∫ 1
r
∫ x
r
(x− y)g(x)g(y)dydx
+
∫ 1
r
∫ r
0
(x− R)g(x)g(y)dydx− c.
Therefore, the optimal entry fee is f =min{ f ∗∗, f ∗}.
Finally, compute the procurer’s expected profit, using the optimal
registration fee and the relationship between R and r , writing pip as
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a function of r . If f ∗∗ ≤ f ∗, one finds
pip = 2
∫ r
0
∫ x
0
(
1
2
x+ 1
4
y)g(x)g(y)dydx+2
∫ 1
r
∫ x
r
yg(x)g(y)dydx
+2
∫ 1
r
∫ r
0
Rg(x)g(y)dydx+2 f ∗∗
=
∫ 1
0
∫ x
0
(x+ 1
2
y)g(x)g(y)dydx+
∫ 1
r
∫ x
r
1
2
yg(x)g(y)dydx,
which is decreasing in r and thus reaches the maximum at r = 0,
associated with R = 0. Thus, in this case, the procurer cannot benefit
from including a minimum score requirement.
Similarly, if f ∗ ≤ f ∗∗,
pip = 2
∫ r
0
∫ x
0
(
1
2
x+ 1
4
y)g(x)g(y)dydx+2
∫ 1
r
∫ x
r
yg(x)g(y)dydx
+2
∫ 1
r
∫ r
0
Rg(x)g(y)dydx+2 f ∗
=
∫ 1
0
∫ x
0
2xg(x)g(y)dydx−2c
= E[X(1)]−2c.
Since E[X(1)]−2c is the procurer’s expected profit in the auction
without minimum score, it follows also in this case that the procurer
cannot benefit from a minimum score requirement.
Part II.
Strategic Information
Transmission in Sequential
Auctions

4. Signal Jamming in a
Sequence of First-Price
Auctions1
4.1. Introduction
Many market transactions have the structure of an auction, and many
such auctions are recurring events. For example, price competition
between retailers is essentially a (reverse) auction. And this auction
is typically a recurring event in which the relevant valuations (unit
costs) are stable, at least for some time. Evidently, in these cases
bidders must pay attention to the information they reveal about their
valuations through their bids. This gives rise to a problem of strategic
1This chapter is based on Ding, Jeitschko, and Wolfstetter (2010).
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information transmission.
The present chapter analyzes this problem in a stylized model of
a recurring auction, where two bidders meet in a sequence of two
first-price auctions. Bidders valuations are iid random variables
(private-values model). Bidders draw their own valuation prior to
the first auction, which is their private information. That valuation
applies also to the second auction. Bidders want to win each auction,
but they are also concerned with concealing their valuation in order
to reduce the intensity of price competition.
If bidders were to play a strictly monotone increasing strategy in the
first auction, which they would do if they played myopically and
ignored how their early bid affects bidding in the later auction, they
would reveal their private information, and the second auction would
be one under complete information, resulting in fierce competition
that wipes out profits. Bidders may thus attempt to keep their rival
unsure about their valuation by sending an ambiguous, non-revealing
signal. This may be achieved by mimicking the bidder with a low
valuation, with positive probability.
In communication theory, the introduction of artificial noise into
communication is called signal-jamming.2 In this sense, a sequential
2In finance, the notion of signal-jamming has been used to describe the behavior
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auction gives rise to signal-jamming if bidders keep their rivals “in
the dark” about their type, with positive probability, until the last
auction is played.
Similar partial pooling results (non-monotone bidding strategies)
have been observed in other branches of the auctions literature. For
example, Haile (2000) finds that the possibility of resale, triggered by
more precise information acquired after the auction, induces pooling
for a range of low signals at a bid equal to the reserve price.
The fact that an equilibrium in strictly monotone strategies may
cease to exist has been noted elsewhere in the literature for similar
settings. For example, Waehrer (1999) considers the sequential
procurement of a primary and secondary good that are subject to
closely related cost. The primary good is procured in an auction,
and the the procurer uses the information revealed in the auction
to negotiate the terms of procuring the secondary good. His main
result is the impossibility result that the auction cannot have a strict
monotone i.e., fully revealing equilibrium, and hence the auction
cannot assure efficiency.
Kannan (2010) compares the impact of different information revela-
of investors with insider information who buy or sell securities in such a way
that their information cannot be fully detected.
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tion policies in a sequential auction on bidding behavior and social
welfare. In particular, he compares the policy of publishing all bids
vs publishing only the winning bid and shows by examples that either
policy can be optimal for the procurer.
Mu¨nster (2009) adapts the sequential auction model to a repeated
contest (which is essentially a repeated all-pay auction), and also
identifies a partial pooling equilibrium. There, pooling also serves
the purpose to blur the information revealed through bids to prevent
that the procurer resp. other contestants take(s) advantage of it.
The present chapter can also be viewed as a follow-up to Jeitschko
and Wolfstetter (2002). However, that paper assumes that bidders
draw new valuations before each auction, which may however be
stochastically dependent, due to stochastic scale effects; whereas
the present chapter assumes that valuations remain stable across
auctions. Both models are suitable to analyze different applications
in economics. For example, assuming stable or perfectly correlated
valuations is appropriate for analyzing wine, stamp, and real estate
auctions where different lots of (almost) identical goods are usually
auctioned within minutes. Whereas assuming imperfectly corre-
lated valuations is compelling when there is long time lag between
auctions, like in many licence auctions or procurements of military
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hardware.
After presenting the model (Section 4.2) and its equilibrium (Section
4.3), we consider signal-jamming in greater detail in Section 4.4.
This is followed by an examination on how signal-jamming affects
the distribution of prices across the two auctions (Section 4.5).
4.2. The model
Consider a sequence of first-price auctions for two identical objects,
and two ex ante symmetric bidders, named 1 and 2. Bidders draw
their valuation before the first auction and keep that valuation to the
second.
Valuations V are iid random variables which assume either a low
value 0 (normalized) or a high value v > 0, i.e., V ∈ {0,v}, with
probability ρ := Pr{V = v} ∈ (0,1).
The auction is sequential. Before the second object is auctioned,
bidders observe both bids of the first auction, and use this information
to update their beliefs concerning their rival’s valuation.
If two bidders tie in the auction, the winner is selected by the flip of
a fair coin, with one exception: If bidders tie in the second auction,
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the winner in the first auction is selected as the winner also for the
second auction. In particular, if bidders tie in the second auction and
exactly one bid was positive in the first auction, the one who made a
positive bid in the first auction is declared as winner of the second.
Without this assumption the existence of equilibrium fails.3 However,
this nonexistence problem is artificial since existence can be restored
by allowing positive but infinitesimally small bids. Therefore, it
is appropriate to bypass this problem by a convenient tie rule, as
proposed here.
We denote bidder i’s bid in the j-th auction by b ji , and continuation
payoffs by pi(h), where h denotes the history of the game prior to
the second auction.
4.3. Equilibrium strategies
A bidder with valuation V = 0 obviously bids zero with certainty in
both auctions (which will not be repeated from here onwards). This
does, however, not imply that a zero bid can only come from a bidder
with valuation V = 0. Indeed, in a signal-jamming equilibrium a
3The proof is in appendix 4.A.1.
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high value bidder, with V = v, may also bid zero in the first auction
in order to keep his rival in doubt about his valuation.
We now solve the equilibrium strategies of a bidder with valuation
V = v in both auctions, for all possible histories of the game.
The possible histories, h, of the game are described by the past bids
which have been observed by both players. The following histories
must be distinguished; there, only the sign of observed bids matters.
1. The history at the beginning of the game, h∅.
2. The histories with equal bids, either both zero or both positive:
h00 := {b11 = 0,b12 = 0}, and h11 := {b11 > 0,b12 > 0}.
3. The histories with one positive bid and one bid equal to zero:
h10 := {b11 > 0,b12 = 0}, and h01 := {b11 = 0,b12 > 0}.
We solve the game recursively, using the equilibrium concept of a se-
quential equilibrium with observable moves. Unless stated otherwise,
we represent strategies as cumulative distribution functions.
As a working hypothesis, suppose F : [0, b¯]→ [0,1] is the symmet-
ric equilibrium mixed strategy of a bidder with V = v in the first
auction (history h∅), and suppose that he may also bid zero in the
first auction with positive probability in order to keep his rival in
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doubt about his valuation, i.e., F(0) may be positive. This allows us
to characterize the equilibrium play in the second auction, and then
confirm the working hypothesis concerning the equilibrium play in
the first auction. Altogether, this procedure confirms that the game
has a unique symmetric equilibrium.
To avoid unnecessary duplication we will state only the equilibrium
strategies and beliefs of one player, named player 1.
4.3.1. Equilibrium in the second auction
After the first auction, bidders observe their bids, process this infor-
mation to update their beliefs about the rival bidder’s valuation, and
then play the second auction. Updated beliefs must be consistent
with the equilibrium strategy of the first auction and observed bids.
Hence,
Lemma 4.1 (Consistent beliefs). Suppose player 1 observed the bid
b12. Consistency of his beliefs with the equilibrium strategy of the
first auction requires:
Pr{V2 = v | b12} =

1 if b12 > 0
F(0)ρ
F(0)ρ+(1−ρ) =: q if b12 = 0.
(4.1)
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Proof. Using Bayes’ rule and the predicted strategy of bidder 2 one
finds
q := Pr{V2 = v|b12 = 0}
= Pr{b
1
2 = 0|V2 = v}ρ
Pr{b12 = 0|V2 = v}ρ+Pr{b12 = 0|V2 = 0}(1−ρ)
= F(0)ρ
F(0)ρ+ (1−ρ)
(4.2)
Using a similar procedure one can confirm that Pr{V2 = v | b12 >
0} = 1.
Note, this belief system involves only a fairly innocent prescription
of “off-equilibrium path” beliefs by stipulating that Pr{V2 = v | b12 >
0} = 1 also for bids that are higher than “predicted”, i.e. for b12 > b¯.
Using these consistent beliefs, we now characterize the equilibrium
strategies of the second auction, depending on the relevant history of
the game.
Proposition 4.1. Consider the second auction. The equilibrium
strategy of player 1 (with V1 = v) depends on the history as follows:
h11⇒ b21 = v, and
G : [0,qv]→ [0,1],G(b)= b(1−q)
(v−b)q =
b(1−ρ)
(v−b)ρF(0) (4.3)
96 Signal Jamming in a Sequence of First-Price Auctions
if h ∈ {h00,h01}
H : [0,qv]→ [0,1],H(b)= v(1−q)
v−b =
v(1−ρ)
(v−b)(1−ρ+ρF(0))
(4.4)
if h = h10.
H has one mass point at b= 0, H(0)= (1−ρ)/(1−ρ+ρF(0))= 1−q > 0.
The associated equilibrium continuation payoffs are pi(h11)= 0 and
pi(h00)= pi(h10)= pi(h01)= v(1−ρ)F(0)ρ+(1−ρ) = v(1−q).
Proof. The strategies and payoffs are self-evident for h11, since both
believe that the rival has high value with certainty and both will bid
v in the second round. Whoever wins will have payoff 0.
A bidder with V = v who observed history h00 must be indifferent
between all bids from the support of his strategy, [0,qv]. If he bids
b= qv, he wins for sure and earns a payoff equal to v−qv; whereas
if he bids b ∈ [0,qv) his payoff is equal to (v−b)(qG(b)+ (1−q)),
i.e. either in case the rival has high value, makes positive but lower
bid, or in case the rival has low value and makes zero bid for sure.
Therefore, one must have, for all b ∈ [0,qv)
(v−b)(qG(b)+ (1−q))= v(1−q), (4.5)
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which is obviously satisfied for the function G stated in (4.3).
The continuation payoff of that player is equal to the payoff he earns
if he plays b = qv (by the above indifference property), which is
pi(h00)= v(1−q)= v(1−ρ)F(0)ρ+ (1−ρ). (4.6)
Histories h01 and h10 result in an asymmetric auction in which it must
be shown that the asserted equilibrium strategies keep both bidders
indifferent between all bids from the support of their strategies,
[0,qv]. Choose b ∈ [0,qv) and b′ = qv. Then, for history h01,
the indifference condition for bidder 2 (the bidder who had made a
positive bid) is
(v−b)(qG(b)+ (1−q))= v(1−q). (4.7)
Again, the left hand side is the expected payoff by bidding b, while
the right hand side is the expected payoff by bidding 0. Our tie rule
favors the bidder who made a positive bid, such that bidder 2 would
win by bidding zero if bidder 1 makes a zero bid, which happens
with probability (1−q). Note that bidder 1’s strategy is G that has
no mass point. This implies bidder 1 who made a zero bid would bid
zero again if and only if he has low value. Inserting G and q shows
that condition is satisfied for all b ∈ [0,qv).
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Similarly, bidder 1 who had made a zero bid is indifferent between
bidding b and bidding qv
(v−b)H(b)= v(1−q), (4.8)
taking into account that bidder 1 believes that bidder 2 has high value
for sure. Inserting q and H shows that this condition is satisfied for
all b ∈ [0,qv).
Since all bids from the support of the mixed strategies G, H are best
replies to the rival’s strategy, the equilibrium continuation payoffs
are obtained by evaluating payoffs at b = qv, which gives, for both
players,
pi(h10)= pi(h01)= v(1−q)= v(1−ρ)F(0)ρ+ (1−ρ). (4.9)
Figure 4.1 depicts the bid-distribution of high types in the second
auction when there is no complete information revelation after the
first auction/for the histories h10 resp. h01.
Note, the mass point H(0) > 0 is due to the fact that in histories
h01,h10 our tie rule favors the bidder who made a positive bid in the
first auction and lets him win with a zero bid in the second auction
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Figure 4.1.: Second-Auction Bid Distributions G and H (v = 1 and
ρ = .85).
if both bidders bid zero in the second auction. This tie rule makes
it profitable to bid zero with positive probability in history h10 resp.
h01. Also note that H(0) is strictly decreasing in ρ since speculating
on V2 = 0 is obviously less attractive as ρ increases.
A bidder benefits from signal jamming in the first auction if his rival
happens to have a high valuation. Signal jamming makes the rival
change his belief from ρ to q < ρ. If the rival made a positive bid in
the first auction, that change in his beliefs makes the rival bid less
aggressively, G(b) < H(b),∀b ∈ [0,qv), to the benefit of the bidder
who engaged in signal jamming. And if the rival also engaged in
signal jamming, both bidders bid less aggressively and preserve a
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positive expected profit in the second auction, while profits would
have been completely wiped out if they had both abstained from
signal jamming.
4.3.2. Equilibrium in the first auction
In the first auction, a bidder with high valuation may wish to invest
in signal jamming and keep his rival uninformed about his valuation.
This pays off in the event when the rival has also a high valuation.
Because if a bidder can influence his high value rival to believe with
higher probability that he has a low valuation, the rival bidder will
be induced to bid low, to the advantage of the high value bidder who
concealed his valuation. However, signal jamming is costly, and its
benefit outweighs the cost only if it is sufficiently likely to compete
with high value bidder.
Proposition 4.2. Suppose ρ > 1/3. The equilibrium strategy in the
first auction (conditional on V = v) is F : [0, b¯]→ [0,1]:
F(b) := b−bρ+2ρv−2v+v
√
3−4ρ+ρ2
(v−b)ρ (4.10)
b¯ := v
(
2−ρ−
√
3−4ρ+ρ2
)
. (4.11)
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F has a mass point at zero: F(0) = √(1/ρ−1)(3/ρ−1)− 2(1/ρ−
1)> 0 which has maximum at ρ= 3/4 and approaches zero as ρ→ 1.
Proof. Consider one bidder, say bidder 1 with V = v, and history h∅
(first auction). To confirm the asserted equilibrium mixed strategy F ,
stated in (4.10), we must show that this bidder is indifferent between
all bids from the support of F , which is [0, b¯] where b¯ is stated in
(4.11).
If bidder 1 with V = v makes a bid b ∈ (0, b¯] his payoff is equal to
(v−b+pi(h11))ρ (F(b)− F(0))
+(v−b+pi(h10))((1−ρ)+ρF(0)) . (4.12)
The first summand is the overall payoff for the case that bidder 2 has
high value, makes positive but lower bid. The second is the overall
payoff for the case that bidder 2 makes a zero bid.
If bidder 1 bids zero, his payoff is(v
2
+pi(h00)
)
(ρF(0)+ (1−ρ))+pi(h01)ρ(1− F(0)). (4.13)
By inserting F it follows immediately that (4.3.2) and (4.13) are
identical for all b ∈ [0, b¯], which proves that F is the equilibrium
strategy for history h∅ (first auction).
102 Signal Jamming in a Sequence of First-Price Auctions
Having derived the signal-jamming equilibrium that obtains for ρ >
1/3, we now briefly analyze the case when the event V = v is not very
likely (ρ ≤ 1/3).
Proposition 4.3. Suppose ρ ≤ 1/3. The equilibrium strategies in the
first auction are as follows: if V = 0, bid zero with certainty, and if
V = v play the “myopic” mixed strategy K : [0,ρv]→ [0,1], which
has no mass point4
K (b) := 1−ρ
ρ
b
v−b . (4.14)
(In the second auction, the bidder with V = v bids v if he observed
a positive first-auction bid from his rival, and otherwise bids 0.)
Proof. The high valued bidder’s overall (i.e., two-period) equilib-
rium expected payoff is equal to 2v(1− ρ). Bidding outside of
the support of the equilibrium strategy is clearly dominated. When
placing positive mass on the lower end of the support, the first
auction instantaneous payoff is positive only when winning a tie
against the low-type rival, 12(1−ρ)v, and the second auction payoff
is bounded above by v. The overall payoff is thus bounded above by
4The “myopic” strategy K is the equilibrium of the associated one-shot-game. It
is a strictly monotone (separating) strategy.
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2(1−ρ)v+v. This bound is below the equilibrium expected payoff
of 2v(1−ρ) whenever ρ ≤ 13 .
Remark 4.1. This equilibrium obtained for the case ρ ≤ 1/3 is the
unique symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium, but not a sequential
equilibrium. In order to see this suppose one bidder, say bidder 1, has
valuation V1 = v and observed history h00. Consistency of beliefs
with first round strategies implies that bidder should believe with
probability one that V2 = 0 and therefore that bidder 2 will bid zero.
But then bidding zero is not the best response of bidder 1 (in fact, no
best response exists in that case, since the payoff functions are not
continuous).
4.4. Signal-jamming
Signal-jamming occurs if a bidder with a high valuation bids zero
in the first auction with positive probability, F(0) > 0, and thus
sometimes mimics a bidder with a low valuation in order to keep the
rival uninformed.
Evidently, F has a mass-point at b = 0 if and only if ρ ∈ (1/3,1).
Specifically, given the equilibrium strategy in Proposition 4.2, one
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obtains
F(0)=
√(
1
ρ
−1
)(
3
ρ
−1
)
−2
(
1
ρ
−1
)
> 0 ⇐⇒ ρ ∈ (1/3,1).
(4.15)
This probability of signal jamming F(0), as a function of ρ, is
depicted in Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.2.: Probability of Signal-Jamming, F(0), as a function of
ρ.
Altogether, bidder 1 benefits from signal jamming if and only if
bidder 2 also has a high valuation. Signal jamming leads bidder 2 to
update his belief from ρ to Pr{V1 = v | b11 = 0} = q < ρ instead of
revealing bidder 1’s type, which in turn induces him to bid stochas-
4.4 Signal-jamming 105
tically lower, no matter how he bid in the first auction. If bidder 2
made a positive bid in the first auction, he plays the stochastically
lower mixed strategy H(b) > G(b),∀b ∈ [0,qv], and if he also en-
gaged in signal jamming, both bidders play the mixed strategy G
which preserves a positive expected profit in the second auction.
However, signal jamming is also costly since it entails the risk of
losing the first auction. It follows that it pays to “invest” in signal-
jamming only if it is sufficiently likely that the rival has a high
valuation. Interestingly, this relationship is not monotone, and F(0)
has a global maximum at ρ = 3/4.
To see the effect of signal-jamming, it is also useful to compare the
equilibrium strategy in the first auction with that of a myopic bidder,
who does not take into account that his bidding may affect the play
of his rival in the second auction.
Proposition 4.4. Signal-jamming induces pointwise less aggressive
bidding in the first auction, in the sense that the myopic strategy K
first-order stochastically dominates the strategy F¯
F¯(b)≥ K (b), ∀b ∈ [0,ρv]. (4.16)
Proof. This is due to the fact that F(b) ≥ K (b), ∀ρ ∈ [0,1], and
106 Signal Jamming in a Sequence of First-Price Auctions
∀b ∈ [0, b¯]:
F(b)−K (b)= b−bρ+2ρv−2v+v
√
3−4ρ+ρ2
(v−b)ρ −
b(1−ρ)
ρ(v−b)
= v
√
3−4ρ+ρ2−2v(1−ρ)
ρ(v−b) ≥ 0
(4.17)
since the factor
√
3−4ρ+ρ2− 2(1− ρ) is always non-negative.
And F¯ is the continuously extended strategy for the enlarged domain
[0,ρv].
We now consider the effect of signal-jamming on bidding in the
second auction. A useful benchmark is how bidders bid in auctions
in which there is no signal jamming, viz. in which bidders used the
myopic strategies in the first auction. One obtains,
Proposition 4.5. Signal-jamming in the first auction leads to lower
average bidding in the second auction when compared to the bench-
mark in which first-auction bidding is myopic.
Proof. Under myopic bidding the bidder’s types are fully revealed.
In the second auction a bidder with a high value bids zero unless his
rival was also revealed to be high, in which case he bids v. Therefore
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his expected payoff is (1− ρ)v+ ρ · 0 = (1− ρ)v (which is also
the expected payoff when there is no learning). In contrast, in the
equilibrium of the second auction after signal-jamming in the first
auction, by Proposition 4.1 the expectation of a high-valued bidder’s
payoff is given by
E
[
pi2
]= F(0) [(1−ρ+ρF(0))pi(h00)+ρ(1− F(0))pi(h01)]
+ (1− F(0)) [(1−ρ+ρF(0))pi(h10)+ρ(1− F(0))pi(h11)]
= [F(0)+ (1− F(0))(1−ρ+ρF(0))](1−q)v+ρ(1− F(0)) ·0
=
[
F(0)+ (1− F(0))1−ρ
1−q
]
(1−q)v
= [F(0)(1−q)+ (1− F(0))(1−ρ)]v. (4.18)
Since (1−q) is greater than (1−ρ), the second-auction expected
payoff in the equilibrium is higher compared to the benchmark my-
opic bidding. Since both auctions (both myopic bidding and the sec-
ond round auction under signal-jamming) are efficient, high-valued
bidder always gets the good. A higher expected payoff implies
lower expected bids in the equilibrium when compared to myopic
bidding.
While the main purpose of signal-jamming in the first auction is
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to lessen the competition in the second auction, the intuition for
the result is not actually directly tied to this. Indeed, since signal-
jamming is anticipated in equilibrium, it cannot be effective: While
signal-jamming has the effect of reducing the probability in which all
bidder-surplus is wiped out when both types are revealed to be high,
it also implies that bidders types are not fully revealed when they
have low values, inducing their rivals to continue to place positive
bids in instances where otherwise prices would be lower.
An immediate corollary to Propositions 4.4 and 4.5 is that because
signal-jamming lowers bids in both the first and the second auc-
tion compared to a benchmark of myopic bidding, the auctioneer is
strictly better off when auctioning the good off simultaneously. In
sum,
Proposition 4.6. Whenever ρ ∈ (1/3,1) an auctioneer strictly prefers
the simultaneous sale of the goods compared to the sequential sale
in which bids are depressed in both auctions due to signal-jamming.
4.5 Dynamics of equilibrium prices 109
4.5. Dynamics of equilibrium prices
In some sequential auctions it has been observed that prices tend to
decline from first to second auction (see, for example Ashenfelter,
1989, Ashenfelter and Genovese, 1992). Various authors have at-
tempted to explain this “declining price anomaly” (see, for example,
McAfee and Vincent, 1993, Gale and Hausch, 1994, Jeitschko and
Wolfstetter, 2002). In the present context, one might expect that
prices are stochastically increasing since signal jamming involves
bidding low and signal jamming pays only in the first auction. How-
ever, as we now show, this occurs only if the prior probability ρ is
larger than some threshold level that is greater than 1/3.
In the following assume ρ > 1/3 and denote the continuously ex-
tended strategies for the enlarged domain [0,v] by G¯(b) := min
{G(b),1}, H¯(b) :=min{H(b),1}. One can easily confirm that G¯(b)
= G(b), H¯(b)= H(b) for all b ∈
[
0, F(0)ρF(0)ρ+(1−ρ)v
]
=: [0, ¯¯b].
It is straightforward to compute the probability distributions of the
equilibrium price in the first auction P1:
Lemma 4.2. Let ρ > 1/3. Then the probability distribution of the
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equilibrium price in the first auction, FP1 : [0,v]→ [0,1], is
FP1(p) := Pr{P1 ≤ p}
= Pr{b˜11 ≤ p and b˜12 ≤ p}
=

(1−ρ+ρF(p))2 if p ≤ b¯
1 if p ≥ b¯.
(4.19)
FP1 has exactly one mass point, FP1(0)=
(
(1−ρ)−
√
3−4ρ+ρ2
)2
>
0, which is strictly decreasing in ρ with limρ→1 FP1(0)= 0.
Computing the probability distribution of the equilibrium price in
the second auction P2 is a bit more involved. We find:
Lemma 4.3. Let ρ > 1/3. Then the probability distribution of the
equilibrium price in the second auction, FP2 : [0,v]→ [0,1], is for
0≤ p < v:
FP2(p)= Pr{P2 ≤ p}
=ρ2 ((1− F(0))2 ·0+ F(0)2G¯(p)2+2F(0)(1− F(0))G¯(p)H¯(p))
+2ρ(1−ρ)(F(0)G¯(p)+ (1− F(0))H¯(p))+ (1−ρ)2.
(4.20)
FP2 has mass points at p = 0 and at p = v:
FP2(0)= (1−ρ)
√
3−4ρ+ρ2 > 0 (4.21)
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Pr{P2 = v} =
(
2−ρ−
√
3−4ρ+ρ2
)2
> 0, (4.22)
Pr{P2= v} is strictly increasing in ρ, and FP2(0) is strictly decreas-
ing with limρ→1 FP2(0)= 0.
To compute the probability distribution, consider the following
events. Event 1, both bidders have high value which takes place
with probability ρ2. Both bid exactly v with certainty and thus the
price is v in the second auction. This implies that for a given p that
is strictly smaller that v, the probability that the price is lower or
equal to p is zero. Other terms in this event are self-evident. Event
2, one bidder has high value and the other has low value. Recall that
the bidder who made a zero bid in the first auction plays strategy G,
whereas the bidder who made a positive bid in the first round plays
strategy H . And one bidder (the one with low value) makes zero bid
for sure. Event 3, both bidders have low value and both bid zero,
which happens with probability (1−ρ)2. The price is also zero.
We find:
Proposition 4.7. Let ρ > 1/3. Then equilibrium prices are increas-
ing in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance, FP2(p)≤ FP1(p)
(with strict inequality except for p= v), if and only if the prior prob-
ability ρ is sufficiently large, i.e. ρ > ρ∗ := 2− 3/5√5.
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If ρ ∈ (1/3,ρ∗), P2 has more probability mass on low prices than P1
in the lower price range, and more mass on high prices in the upper
price range; therefore, prices are not stochastically increasing in
the sense of first-order stochastic dominance. But the expected price
in the second auction is higher than the expected price in the first
one.
Proof. 1) Suppose ρ > ρ∗. Let p ∈ [0,v) and define (with slight
abuse of notation apply the functions G and H to the enlarged
domain [0,v)):
F˜P2(p) :
=ρ2 ((1− F(0))2 ·0+ F(0)2G(p)2+2F(0)(1− F(0))G(p)H(p))
+2ρ(1−ρ)(F(0)G(p)+ (1− F(0))H(p))+ (1−ρ)2.
By definition, G(p) ≥ G¯(p),H(p) ≥ H¯(p). Therefore, it follows
immediately that F˜P2(p) is a pointwise upper bound of FP2(p), i.e.,
F˜P2(p)≥ FP2(p), for all p ∈ [0,v), and hence, in particular, for all
p ∈ [0, b¯].
As one can easily confirm, FP1 > F˜P2(p),∀p ∈ [0, b¯] ⇐⇒ ρ > ρ∗.
Since FP1(p)= 1,∀b ≥ b¯ and FP2 < 1,∀b < v (since it has a mass
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point at p = v), we conclude that ρ > ρ∗⇒ FP2(p)≤ FP1(p), with
strict inequality everywhere except at p = v, as asserted.
2) Suppose ρ < ρ∗. Then, as one can easily confirm, FP2(0) >
FP1(0). Moreover, FP1(p)= 1> FP2(p),∀p ∈ [b¯,v) (since FP1(b¯)=
1 and FP2 has a mass point at p= v). Therefore, FP2(p) and FP1(p)
must intersect at least once; hence no first-order stochastic domi-
nance relationship applies to P2 and P1.
Despite a ranking in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance
not being possible, the ranking of expected prices is unambiguous.
For expected price in the first auction, use has been made of Proposi-
tion 4.2:
E[P1]=
∫ v
0
pd FP1(p)
=
∫ b¯
0
2p[1−ρ+ρF(p)]ρ d F(p)
dp
dp
=
∫ b¯
0
−
2pv2
(
−1+ρ+
√
3−4ρ+ρ2
)2
(p−v)3 dp
= v
(
7+2ρ(ρ−4)+2(ρ−2)
√
3−4ρ+ρ2
)
(4.23)
Similarly, the expected price in the second auction auction (note that
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FP2 has a mass point at p = v), using equations 4.20 and 4.22, is:
E[P2]=
∫ v
0
pd FP2(p)
=
∫ ¯¯b
0
p
d FP2(p)
dp
dp+vPr{P2 = v}
=
∫ ¯¯b
0
2pv2(−1+ρ)2
(
−3+ρ+
√
3−4ρ+ρ2
)
(p−v)3
(
−1+ρ+
√
3−4ρ+ρ2
) dp
+v
(
2−ρ−
√
3−4ρ+ρ2
)2
=
v
(
14−5ρ3+25ρ2−34ρ− (8+5ρ2−14ρ)
√
3−4ρ+ρ2
)
−1+ρ+
√
3−4ρ+ρ2
(4.24)
The difference between the prices is, after some arrangements
E[P1]− E[P2]= v
√
3−4ρ+ρ2
(
−7+5ρ+4
√
3−4ρ+ρ2
)
,
(4.25)
where the term in the parenthesis is non-positive for all ρ ∈ [ 13 ,1),
zero for ρ = 13 and strictly negative for ρ ∈ (1/3,ρ∗).
This result is illustrated in Fig 4.3 which plots the probability dis-
tributions of FP1,FP2 for ρ = 1/2 < ρ∗ (figure on the left), and for
ρ = 3/4 > ρ∗ (figure on the right).
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Figure 4.3.: Comparison FP1 (dashed) and FP2 (solid) for v = 1 and
ρ = 1/2 < ρ∗ (left) resp. ρ = 3/4 > ρ∗ (right)
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A ranking in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance is not
possible (neither in the sense of second-order stochastic dominance)
for the case of ρ ∈ (1/3,ρ∗), because for smaller values of ρ (yet large
enough to induce signal-jamming) the probability of both bidders
having a high value and this being revealed in the auction becomes
very small. As a result, a lot of mass is placed on low bids, yet,
because the event of full information leakage (both bidders are re-
vealed to have high values) nonetheless has positive probability the
mass-point at the upper end of the value-support implies a crossing
of the price distributions for low values of ρ.
4.6. Discussion
The information leakage that can take place between auctions leads
bidders with high values to signal-jam in the first auction—thereby
depressing prices. Moreover, in the signal-jamming equilibrium
prices are also depressed compared to the myopic benchmark. An
immediate implication of this strategic manipulation and use of in-
formation is that the auctioneer is harmed by signal-jamming in both
auctions and would benefit from the prevention of such strategic
information manipulation (e.g., by conducting a simultaneous auc-
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tion). Similarly, the implication for markets in which firms compete
in prices is that consumer surplus decreases due to signal-jamming.
Since signal-jamming is directly tied to the information structure
of the game, some policy implications readily follow: in procure-
ment auctions and Bertrand competition it may be undesirable from
a revenue/consumer surplus standpoint to increase the amount of
information that is generated by the auction mechanism—as in try-
ing to circumvent this, bidders become less aggressive; moreover,
information may be better protected in order to circumvent such
strategic manipulation of information, as this induces inefficiencies
in the first auction, whenever there is a tie between a high and a low
type and the low types wins. In this vein it is important to better
understand other informational structures, such as bidding when only
the winning bid is revealed, or when only the identity (but not the
bid) of the winner is made public.
In the present chapter we assumed that bidders have stable valuations.
An alternative framework would be to assume that valuations are
subject to stochastic scale effects, as in Jeitschko and Wolfstetter
(2002).
We also assumed that bidders observe all first auction bids before
they bid in the second auction. If instead bidders could only learn
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whether they either won or lost the first auction, in some subgames
bidders would know the rank order of valuations, as in Landsberger,
Rubinstein, Wolfstetter, and Zamir (2001) and Fe´vrier (2003).
Moreover, we assumed a passive auctioneer. Therefore, signal jam-
ming served exclusively the purpose of misleading the rival bidder.
The scope of signal jamming is further increased if the auctioneer
employs reserve prices and is able to adjust them by taking advantage
of information acquired during the first auction.
This angle of the signal jamming issue has been addressed in Caillaud
and Mezzetti (2004) who consider a sequence of English clock
auctions, and assume that the auctioneer employs reserve prices
in each auction, but is unable to commit himself to a sequence of
reserve prices prior to the auctions.
Unlike in our model, bidders have no interest in influencing other bid-
ders’ beliefs, since in an English clock auction equilibrium bidding
is not affected by bidders’ beliefs concerning each others’ private
values. However, the auctioneer’s belief about bidders valuations af-
fects his choice of optimal reserve price. Therefore, bidders take into
account how their bids in the first auction may affect the auctioneer’s
belief, updated after observing the outcome of the first auction, and
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thus the reserve price in the second auction.
This link is briefly explained as follows.
Following Myerson (1981), the optimal selling method is to sell both
objects in one bundle and to set the usual static optimal reserve price
for that bundle, or equivalently, to sell one good each in a sequence of
two auctions and set the same reserve price in both auctions, exactly
equal to one half of the reserve price of the optimal bundle auction.
However, this optimal sequence of auctions is not time consistent.
Since the auctioneer is free to adjust the reserve price after he ob-
served the outcome of the first auction, he will always reset the
reserve price in such a way that it reflects his updated beliefs about
bidders’ valuations. Of course, bidders anticipate that the auction-
eer will use information revealed during the first auction to their
disadvantage, and thus attempt to engage in some form of signal
jamming.
The main result of Caillaud and Mezzetti (2004) is that in this frame-
work signal jamming takes a simple form: Like in a static setting,
bidders bid truthfully if they bid; however, some bidder types strate-
gically refrain from participation in the first auction, i.e., they do
not bid even though their valuation exceeds the reserve price. This
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strategic nonparticipation has the purpose to affect the beliefs of the
auctioneer in such a way that he keeps the second auction reserve
price lower. As Caillaud and Mezzetti (2004, p.78) put it: “Some
buyers who would profitably buy at the reserve price refrain from
participating in order to decrease the second auction reserve price.”
4.A. Appendix
4.A.1. Some notes on the tie rule
Here we show that no equilibrium exists if one uses the tie rule to
select the winner by flipping a fair coin.
Proof. Consider history h10. Denote the second auction strategy of
player 1 by F21 : [0, b¯]→ [0,1] and that of player 2 by F22 : [0, b¯]→
[0,1], both conditional on Vi = v. Using the tie rule of flipping a fair
coin instead of tie rule assumed in the chapter (that in the event of
a tie player 1 wins the second auction), bidding zero in the second
auction is a strictly dominated strategy for bidders with Vi = v. This
is because whenever player i wins by bidding zero (the case of a tie
at 0 and wins expected 12v), there is a profitable deviation by bidding
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a little bit  more than zero, winning for sure and getting v−  > 12v.
Therefore, one has F21 (0)= F22 (0)= 0.
First, suppose there is no mass on b¯. Then, in equilibrium, the
indifference conditions require for all b21,b
2
2 ∈ [0, b¯]:
(1−q+q F22 (b21))(v−b21)= v− b¯ (4.26)
F21 (b
2
2)(v−b22)= v− b¯. (4.27)
The left-hand side of these equations is player 1’s (resp. player 2’s)
expected payoff when bidding b21 ∈ [0, b¯) (resp. b22 ∈ [0, b¯)), and the
right-hand side is his expected payoff by bidding b¯. Evidently, these
two equations cannot both hold for bids close to zero, which means
in turn that no such equilibrium strategies F21 ,F
2
2 exist.
Second, we show that there cannot be mass on b¯. If there were mass
on b¯, the second indifference condition (4.27) changes to
LHS := F21 (b22)(v−b22)= (1−m1)(v− b¯)+m1
1
2
(v− b¯)=: RHS
where m1 > 0 denotes the probability with which player 1 bids b¯.
Note that this holds for all b22 ∈ [0, b¯) and that
lim
b22→b¯
LHS= (1−m1)(v− b¯) 6= (1− 12m1)(v− b¯)= RHS.
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Therefore, this indifference condition does not hold for those bids
close to b¯.
Part III.
Signaling in Market Games
with Downstream
Interaction

5. Decentralized
Union-Oligopoly Bargaining1
5.1. Introduction
The present chapter analyzes decentralized wage bargaining in a
unionized oligopoly industry when firms are subject to incomplete
information concerning their cost. The novel feature of the proposed
model is that wages may signal firms’ private information. This
potential for signaling has a significant effect on the equilibrium
wage profile negotiated by unions and firms.
When firms interact in a downstream oligopoly market, signaling
strength confers a strategic advantage since the rival firm tends to
1This chapter is based on Ding (2010).
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be a less aggressive player if he is made to believe that one’s own
cost is low. Of course, in equilibrium no misleading signaling occurs.
Nevertheless, the potential for signaling shapes the equilibrium wage
profile and, as we show, introduces an upward push on wages.
Following the bulk of the literature on wage bargaining, we assume
that unions and firms negotiate wage rates but leave the firm free to
choose employment. This assumption is commonly known as the
“right-to-manage model” (Oswald, 1982). The alternative would be to
assume complete contracts that stipulate both wages and employment
as in Leontief (1946) and McDonald and Solow (1981). The latter
has the advantage that the bargaining outcome is on the contract curve
and thus assures efficiency. However, empirical evidence suggests
that firms set employment unilaterally (see Hall and Lilien, 1979),
which is why the labor literature usually prefers the “right-to-manage
model”.
The analysis is closely related to the literature on union-firm bargain-
ing in an oligopoly industry, initiated by Davidson (1988), Horn and
Wolinski (1988), Dowrick (1989). That literature generally assumes
a framework of complete information, and focuses on a comparison
between the outcome of collective bargaining when a single wage is
bargained at the industry-level, which is typically the case in coun-
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tries like Germany (see Haucap, Pauly, and Wey, 2007), and when
wages are bargained at the firm-level which is typically the case in
the U.S. The main finding of that literature is that bargaining at the
firm level leads to lower wages if firms’ products are substitutes, be-
cause if a firm agrees to a higher wage, its competitive position in the
aftermarket is weakened, and the competitor takes advantage of it by
raising his output and employment. Whereas industry wide bargain-
ing internalizes that externality, and thus leads to higher equilibrium
wages.2
Compared to this literature, the distinct feature of the present chapter
is that we introduce incomplete information and allow for signaling.
As we show, the potential for signaling exerts an upward pressure on
the wages negotiated at the firm level which contributes to reverse
the ranking of wages negotiated by unions at the firm level relative
to the wages negotiated by an industry wide union.
A related paper by Vannetelbosch (1997) also covers wage-bargaining
under incomplete information. However, he assumes that the bar-
gaining parties are subject to incomplete information concerning
2This case of substitutes was covered by Davidson (1988); Horn and Wolinski
(1988) showed that the reverse is true if products are complements.
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their respective discount rates rather than with respect to their cost.3
Another recent paper by Mukherjee and Suetrong (2010) considers
the impact of the union structure on firms’ foreign direct investment,
and shows that decentralized unions may give rise to higher wages.
Methodologically, the present analysis is also related to the literature
on auctions with externalities where bidders interact after the auction
in an oligopoly game, and bids may reveal bidders’ private informa-
tion (Goeree, 2003, Das Varma, 2003, Ding, Fan, and Wolfstetter,
2010). The crucial difference between these and our contribution is
that auctions give rise to a winner-takes-all situation, which involves
considerably different issues and solution procedures.
The plan of the chapter is as follows: In Section 5.2 we state the
model. Section 5.3 introduces two benchmark models that cover two
possible interpretations of the model without signaling. In the first
interpretation signaling is excluded because firms’ cost parameters
become common knowledge before firms play the oligopoly game
(similar to the auctions with externalities analysis by Jehiel and
Moldovanu (2000)), whereas in the second interpretation signaling is
3A strong point of Vannetelbosch (1997) is that he considers an alternating offer
bargaining game in the spirit of Rubinstein (1982) whereas we employ the
Nash-bargaining solution based on Nash (1950).
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excluded because firms do not observe each others’ wages and play
a simultaneous moves game in the spirit of the complete contracts
model of Leontief (1946) and McDonald and Solow (1981). In
Section 5.4 we analyze our model in which signaling is possible
and compare the equilibrium wage profile to those of the benchmark
models. The chapter concludes in Section 5.5 with a discussion.
Some technical proofs are in the Appendix.
5.2. The model
Consider a duopoly industry where firms engage in decentralized
wage bargaining with union. Each firm draws its employees from a
“large” pool of union members. Unions are firm specific, and they are
able to require a “union shop” that employs only union members.4
Each firm and its union negotiates a wage rate, w, to be paid per
worker (labor time is fixed), but allows firms to freely choose employ-
ment as long as they pay the stipulated wage. Therefore, the set-up
4In the U.S. the Taft-Hartley Act outlawed the “closed shop” in 1947, but permits
the “union shop”, except in those states that have passed right-to-work laws.
In a “union shop” unions may require that those who are employed become
members of the union. This is the case when the union is sufficiently strong.
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is that of the so called “right-to-manage” model which is frequently
applied in the labor literature (see, for example, Oswald, 1982).
After wages have been negotiated, they are publicly observed, and
the two firms, named 1 and 2, play a Cournot market game with
(perfect) substitutes. For simplicity, inverse market demand P is
linear in outputs L1, L2
P(Q) :=max{1−Q,0}, Q := L1+ L2. (5.1)
Firms use capital and labor with fixed input coefficient (Leontief-
technology). Firms have the same labor input coefficient, normalized
to 1, so that L i stands for output as well as employment of firm i ,
whereas capital input coefficients, denoted by θi , may differ.
Each firm knows its own capital input coefficient but not that of
the other. Firms view their rival’s capital input coefficients as iid
random variable, drawn from the continuously differentiable c.d.f.
F : [0,α]→ [0,1] (private values assumption), with expected value
θ¯ := ∫ α0 yd F(y).
Workers and firms are risk neutral and their default payoffs are taken
to be equal to zero. Workers’ utility function is additively separable
in income and employment.
5.2 The model 131
The union represents its members. Without loss of generality, the
number of union members is taken to be equal to 1. Members are
drawn at random into employment. Therefore, L i does not only
measure employment and output, but also the probability that a
union member is drawn into employment.
The union’s payoff is equal to (the expectation is taken over the
unknown cost parameter of the rival firm)5
Uu =
∫ α
0
L i (wi − δ)d F(θ j ), (5.2)
where δ represent the cost of foregone leisure and is exogenously
given. Firms’ expected profit is
U f =
∫ α
0
(
1− L i − L j −wi − θi
)
L i d F(θ j ). (5.3)
And the payoff of union-firm coalitions is their Nash product
N :=U f Uu. (5.4)
The game is as follows:
1. Firms simultaneously negotiate wage rates with their respec-
tive union, maximizing their Nash product N . There, strategies
5For simplicity of exposition, we ignore severance payments to unemployment
members.
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are wage schedules (w1(θ),w2(θ)) that prescribe wage rates
contingent on each firm’s cost parameter θ .
2. The negotiated wages are paid and publicly observed, and
firms update their beliefs concerning the unknown cost param-
eter of their rival.
3. Firms play a simultaneous moves Cournot duopoly game,
based on the observed wages and updated beliefs. There, firms
maximize profits. Strategies are outputs resp. employment
(L1, L2).
Throughout the chapter we assume for the two parameters α,δ that
α <
(1− δ)
2
. (5.5)
This condition, which is exclusively used in Proposition 5.3, assures
that, in a particular sense, no profile of opportunity costs of the two
firm-union coalitions propels monopoly.6
6Suppose firm/union coalitions base their outputs decision on their respective
opportunity costs. These opportunity costs are (c1,c2) := (θ1 + δ,θ2 + δ).
Then, the most favorable case for monopoly is the profile θ1 = α,θ2 = 0, or
vice versa. The above condition assures that even in that most favorable case
for monopoly, both equilibrium outputs are positive.
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5.3. Benchmark model(s) without signaling
As a benchmark we first consider two variations of our model that
characterize the equilibrium wage profile when signaling is not possi-
ble. These models offer alternative interpretations of union-oligopoly
bargaining in the absence of signaling.
In benchmark model A, the profiles of wages and cost parameters
become common knowledge before firms play the oligopoly game.
That model is a stage game in which firm-union coalitions simulta-
neously choose their wage profile, without knowing their rival’s cost
parameter, and firms then continue to play a duopoly game under
complete information.
In benchmark model B, firms neither observe the wage profile nor
the profile of unit costs when they play the oligopoly game. That
model is a simultaneous moves game, where firm-union coalitions
simultaneously choose their wage profiles and their output resp.
employment, without knowing their rival’s cost parameter.
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5.3.1. Benchmark model A: Stage game without signaling
Suppose signaling is not possible because firms observe the profile
of wages and cost parameters before they play the oligopoly game,
similar to the analysis of license auctions with externalities by Jehiel
and Moldovanu (2000)) where firms observe each others’ private
information before they play the oligopoly game.
In that interpretation, our game without signaling is a simple two-
stage game. In the first stage the two firm-union coalitions simulta-
neously chose their wage schedules, w(·), as a function of own cost
parameter θi , without knowing their rival’s cost parameter θ j . In the
second stage, firms observe the profile of wages, w1,w2, and cost
parameter, θ1,θ2, and then play a Cournot oligopoly game in output
resp. employment strategies under complete information.
The equilibrium strategies of all conceivable oligopoly subgames in
stage 2 are, of course,
L i = 1−2(wi + θi )+w j + θ j3 , i 6= j, i, j = 1,2. (5.6)
The associated equilibrium profits are equal to L2i .
We adopt the following methodology to solve the stage 1 wage
bargaining game:
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As a working hypothesis assume that the game has a symmetric
equilibrium wage schedule, wA(θ).
Consider one firm-union coalition, say coalition 1. Let this coalition
adopt a wage w that may deviate from the equilibrium wage wA(θ),
while the rival firm-union coalition 2 plays the equilibrium strategy
wA(θ2). Then, since wA(θ) is an equilibrium strategy, the following
conditions must hold.
wA(θ)= argmax
w
NA, NA :=U f Uu (5.7)
U f = E(L2A) :=
∫ α
0
L2Ad F(θ2) (5.8)
Uu = E(L A)(w− δ) := (w− δ)
∫ α
0
L Ad F(θ2) (5.9)
L A = 1−2(w+ θ)+wA(θ2)+ θ23 . (5.10)
Here, as elsewhere, the expectation is taken over the random variable
θ2.
Evidently, the equilibrium strategy wA(θ) must satisfy the condition
that ∂wNA|w=wA(θ) = 0,∀θ , where
∂wNA =−43 E(L A)
2 (w− δ)+ E(L2A)
(
E(L A)− 23(w− δ)
)
=−2
3
(w− δ)(2E(L A)2+ E(L2A))+ E(L2A)E(L A) (5.11)
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= (w− δ)E(L2A)E(L A)
(
1
w− δ −
2
3
(
2E(L A)
E(L2A)
+ 1
E(L A)
))
.
(5.12)
Since L A is decreasing in the own wage w, by (5.10), it follows
immediately from (5.11) that ∂wwNA < 0. Therefore, NA is strictly
concave in w and the wage schedule wA is a mutual best reply.
We shall use these facts concerning wA(θ) in Proposition 5.2 below,
where we delineate how the possibility to signal through wages
affects the equilibrium wage schedule.
5.3.2. Benchmark model B: Simultaneous moves game
without signaling
Alternatively, suppose signaling is not possible because firms neither
observe the profile of cost parameters nor the profile of wages before
they play the oligopoly game.
In that interpretation, our game without signaling is a simultaneous
moves game under incomplete information without subgames. There,
firm-union coalitions simultaneously choose their wage profile and
output resp. employment without knowing their rival’s cost param-
eter. Essentially, this benchmark model is the complete contract
model in the spirit of Leontief (1946) and McDonald and Solow
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(1981); the only difference is that we analyze it in a framework of
incomplete information and embed it into an oligopoly framework.
As a working hypothesis we stipulate that this game has a symmetric
and strictly monotone equilibrium, described by the output resp.
employment schedule L B(θ) and the wage schedule wB(θ), which
will be confirmed below.
The symmetric equilibrium, (L B(θ),wB(θ)), solves the following
requirements, for all θ :
L B(θ)= argmax
{L˜(·)}
∫ α
0
∫ α
0
(
1− L˜(θ)− L B(y)−wB(θ)− θ
)
L˜(θ)d F(y)d F(θ) (5.13)
wB(θ)= arg max{w˜(·)}
∫ α
0
∫ α
0
(1− L B(θ)− L B(y)− w˜(θ)− θ)
L B(θ)d F(y)
(∫ α
0
L B(θ)(w˜(θ)− δ)d F(y)
)
d F(θ). (5.14)
The Euler equations of these variational problems, combined with
the equilibrium requirements that the best-response L˜(θ) shall be
equal to L B(θ) and the best-response to w˜(θ) be equal to wB(θ), are
1−2L B(θ)−wB(θ)− θ =
∫ α
0
L B(y)d F(y) (5.15)
1+ δ− L B(θ)−2wB(θ)− θ =
∫ α
0
L B(y)d F(y). (5.16)
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Solving these Euler equations gives the unique equilibrium (recall
θ¯ := E(θ)):
wB(θ)= 14
(
1+3δ+ 1
3
θ¯
)
− 1
3
θ (5.17)
L B(θ)= 14
(
1− δ+ 1
3
θ¯
)
− 1
3
θ. (5.18)
Evidently, both wB and L B are strictly monoton decreasing in the
own cost parameter, which confirms the assumed working hypothesis.
5.4. How signaling affects the equilibrium wage
profile
Now assume that firms only observe the wage profile but not each
others cost parameters before they play the oligopoly game. In that
case, each firm-union coalition may use the wage as a signal of
its cost. Specifically, if the equilibrium wage schedule is strictly
monotone, firms can infer the cost parameter θ that underlies the
observed wage. This gives rise to a signaling issue that affects the
equilibrium schedule.
In particular, each firm-union coalition may use the bargained wage
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to signal strength to their rival, by making the rival believe that
one’s cost parameter θ is lower than it happens to be. As in other
oligopoly contexts, signaling strength confers a strategic advantage
in the oligopoly game.
Of course, in equilibrium no such “misleading” signaling occurs.
However, this requires that the wage schedule is modified in such a
way that the benefit of signaling strength is exactly matched by an
equally high wage cost, at all possible values of the cost parameter
θ .
In the following we characterize the resulting equilibrium wage
schedule. The main purpose of the analysis is to find out how the
possibility to signal one’s cost parameter affects the equilibrium
wage schedule.
The following methodology is employed to characterize the equi-
librium wage schedules: As a working hypothesis we stipulate that
the wage-bargaining games have a symmetric and strictly monotone
equilibrium wage schedule w(θ), either strictly increasing or de-
creasing. Each firm-union coalition can then perfectly infer the cost
parameter of its rival firm-union coalition from the observed wage.
We consider one firm-union coalition, say coalition 1, and without
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loss of generality, restrict attention to those unilateral deviations
from equilibrium play, where coalition 1 applies the wage w(z), as
if its cost parameter where equal to z ∈ [0,α] rather than θ1, while
coalition 2 plays the equilibrium strategy w. By construction, both
players believe that their rival plays equilibrium, and therefore both
take the signal revealed as the true signal. This implies that if z 6= θ1,
firm 2 is mislead to believe that the cost parameter of coalition 1 is z,
after observing w(z).
We solve the payoff function of coalition 1, denoted by N (z,θ), by
solving the duopoly subgames that may occur if coalition 1 unilater-
ally deviates from the equilibrium wage schedule, and then invoke
the equilibrium requirement that no deviation from the equilibrium
wage schedule w shall pay. Of course, in the end, we confirm the
strict monotonicity of the equilibrium wage schedule.
5.4.1. Solution of the duopoly subgames
Each duopoly subgame 0 is fully characterized by the perceived
profile of unit costs (c1,c2). However, the profile of unit costs
perceived by firm 2 may differ from the profile perceived by firm 1.
This occurs when firm-union coalition 1 unilaterally deviates from
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the equilibrium wage profile and thus induces “wrong” beliefs in
firm 2.
Suppose coalition 1 unilaterally deviates from the equilibrium wage
schedule, w(θ1) and sets a wage w(z) rather than w(θ1). Then,
firm 2 is mislead to believe that the profile of unit costs is equal to
(c1,c2)= (w(z)+z,w(θ2)+θ2). In that case, firm 1 understands that
firm 2 believes to play the duopoly subgame 0(w(z)+ z,w(θ2)+θ2).
And firm 1 predicts that firm 2 plays the equilibrium strategy:
L2 = 1−2c2+ c13 =
1−2(w(θ2)+ θ2)+ (w(z)+ z)
3
(5.19)
At the same time, firm 1 privately knows that its true unit cost is
equal to c1 = w(θ1)+ θ1. Therefore, firm 1 plays its best reply to
L2, which gives (for ease of notation we suppress the subscript 1
whenever we refer to firm 1):
L = argmax
L1
(1− L1− L2−w(z)− θ1) L1, (5.20)
which is
L = 1
3
(
1−
(
3
2
θ1+ 12 z+2w(z)
)
+ (w(θ2)+ θ2)
)
. (5.21)
The associated equilibrium profit of firm 1 is equal to pi = L2.
Therefore, for all (z,θ1,θ2), the solution of the subsequent duopoly
subgame is (L , L2).
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5.4.2. Equilibrium wage bargaining
Using the above equilibria of all possible oligopoly subgames, we
now characterize the equilibrium wage profile, and analyze the wage
bargaining problems solved by the two firm-union coalitions. The
wage bargaining game is a simultaneous moves game, where firm-
union coalitions simultaneously choose their wage profiles, maxi-
mizing its Nash product, N , (here and elsewhere expected values are
taken over the random variable θ˜2 and the number of union members
normalized to be equal to 1):
N :=U f Uu (5.22)
U f = E(L2) (payoff of firm 1) (5.23)
Uu = E(L)(w(z)− δ) (payoff of union 1). (5.24)
There, employment levels are determined by the equilibrium of the
continuation game, characterized in the previous section.
The equilibrium wage schedule is that function w that satisfies the
following equilibrium requirement
w(θ)= arg max
z∈(0,α)
N . (5.25)
Since the maximizer of N is the same as that of every concave
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transformation of N , for convenience we now consider maximization
of log N in lieu of maximization of N .
Take the partial derivative of log N w.r.t. z, the first order condition
requires
∂z log N = w
′(z)
w(z)− δ +
∂z E(L2)
E(L2)
+ ∂z E(L)
E(L)
, (5.26)
where
∂z E(L)=−16
(
1+4w′(z)) (5.27)
∂z E(L2)= 2E(L∂z L)=−13
(
1+4w′(z))E(L). (5.28)
Therefore, the equilibrium requirement ∂z log N |z=θ = 0 can be writ-
ten as:
w′(θ)
w(θ)− δ −
(1+4w′(θ))E(L)
3E(L2)
− 1+4w
′(θ)
6E(L)
= 0. (5.29)
If w(θ) is strictly monotone decreasing, it follows immediately that
w′(θ) <− 14 for all θ .
Unfortunately, the equilibrium condition (5.29) is not a regular dif-
ferential equation, since variables cannot be separated. Hence, w(θ)
cannot be explicitly solved. However, some properties of the solution
can be characterized.
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The condition (5.29) is of course only necessary for an equilibrium.
In addition, the equilibrium strategy w(θ) needs to satisfy second-
order conditions for global maxima. In the following we use the
second order conditions to show that the equilibrium wage schedule
cannot be monotone increasing.
Lemma 5.1. ∂zθ log N ≥ 0, for all z,θ , if w′(θ) < 0 everywhere;
and ∂zθ log N ≤ 0, for all z,θ , if w′(θ) > 0 everywhere.
Proof. Note first that ∂E(L)
∂θ
=− 12 and ∂E(L
2)
∂θ
=−E(L). Differenti-
ating (5.26) with respect to θ gives
∂zθ log N = ∂θ∂z E(L
2) · E(L2)− ∂z E(L2) · ∂θ E(L2)
(E(L2)2)
+ ∂θ∂z E(L) · E(L)− ∂z E(L) · ∂θ E(L)
E(L)2
= −
1
3(1+4w′(z))(− 12)E(L2)+ 13(1+4w′(z))E(L) · (−E(L))
(E(L2)2)
+
1
6(1+4w′(z))(− 12)
E(L)2
=− 1
12
(1+4w′(z))
( −2
E(L2)
+ 4E(L)
2
(E(L2))2
+ 1
E(L)2
)
=− 1
12
(1+4w′(z))
((
2E(L)
E(L2)
− 1
E(L)
)2
+ 2
E(L2)
)
We have already shown that w′ < − 14 if w′ < 0. Hence, it follows
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immediately that ∂zθ log N has the opposite sign as w′, as asserted.
Lemma 5.2. If ∂zθ log N ≥ 0, for all z,θ , then the solution of first-
order conditions (5.29) yields a global maximum of log N; and if
∂zθ log N ≤ 0, the solution of first-order conditions (5.29) yields a
global minimum of log N.
Proof. Suppose ∂zθ log N ≥ 0, for all z,θ . Then for a given θ with
∂z log N (z,θ)|z=θ = 0 we have
z < θ ⇒ ∂z log N (z,θ)≥ ∂z log N (z, z)= 0 (5.30)
z > θ ⇒ ∂z log N (z,θ)≤ ∂z log N (z, z)= 0. (5.31)
Therefore, log N is increasing in z to the left and decreasing to the
right of its stationary point θ , which implies that the stationary point
is a global maximum of log N .
Similarly, if ∂zθ log N ≤ 0, for all z,θ , it follows that log N is de-
creasing in z to the left and increasing to the right of its stationary
point, which implies that the stationary point is a global minimum of
log N .
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Proposition 5.1. In a separating equilibrium the wage schedule
w(θ) is strictly monotone decreasing. In particular, w′(θ) <−1/4.
Proof. In a separating equilibrium, one has either w′(θ) > 0, or
w′(θ) < 0 for all θ . We prove that w′(θ) > 0 cannot occur in equi-
librium. The proof is by contradiction.
Supposew′(θ) > 0 for all θ . Then by Lemma 5.1 one has ∂zθ log N ≤
0 for all z,θ . By lemma 5.2 this implies that log N has a global
minimum at z = θ . A global minimum is also a local minimum.
Therefore, log N is convex in z at z = θ , i.e. ∂zz log N |z=θ ≥ 0. Since
∂zz log N = ∂zz N · N − (∂z N )
2
N 2
, (5.32)
the local convexity of log N implies ∂zz N > 0.
Therefore, N has a local minimum at z = θ , for all θ , and hence N
cannot has a global maximum at z = θ , which contradicts that w is
an equilibrium strategy.
As we have already observed above, if w′(θ) < 0, (5.29) implies that
w′(θ) <− 14 for all θ .
Proposition 5.2. The potential for signaling gives rise to a point-
wise higher equilibrium wage schedule compared to the benchmark
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model A, i.e., w(θ) > wA(θ).
Proof. We prove this by showing that the partial derivative of the
Nash product in benchmark model A, ∂wNA, evaluated at w = w(θ)
and w2(θ2) = w(θ2), is negative for all θ . This indicates that the
function NA is declining at w(θ); in other words, since NA has been
shown to be strictly concave in the own wage, w(θ) must be larger
than the maximizer of NA, which is wA, as asserted.
By the equlibrium condition (5.29) of the game with signaling one
has
1
w(θ)− δ =
1+4w′(θ)
6w′(θ)
(
1
E(L)
+ 2E(L)
E(L2)
)
. (5.33)
Therefore, by (5.12) it follows that at w = w(θ), w2(θ2) = w(θ2)
and hence L A = L ,
∂wNA = (w(θ)− δ)E(L2)E(L)
(
1
w(θ)− δ −
2
3
(
2E(L)
E(L2)
+ 1
E(L)
))
= (w(θ)− δ)E(L2)E(L)
(
1+4w′(θ)
6w′(θ)
− 2
3
)(
2E(L)
E(L2)
+ 1
E(L)
)
< 0,
where the last inequality is due to the fact thatw′(θ)< 0 (in particular
w′(θ) <−1/4), by Proposition 5.1.
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Finally, we compare the equilibrium wage schedulew(θ) to the wage
profile in the alternative benchmark model B, where the absence of
signaling occurs because firms neither observe the profile of cost
parameters nor the profile of wages before they play the oligopoly
game. For that purpose we assume specifically that the expected
value of the cost parameter is “not too small”: θ¯ := E(θ)≥ 211α.7
Proposition 5.3. Suppose θ¯ ≥ 211α. The potential for signaling
gives rise to a pointwise higher equilibrium wage schedule also
compared to the benchmark model B, i.e., w(θ) > wB(θ).
Proof. We show that ∂z N , evaluated at w(θ)= wB(θ) and z = θ , is
negative at all θ . This shows that the wage schedule wB(θ) induces
signaling strength by playing as if the cost parameter were lower
than the true θ . To remove that incentive to signal strength, the wage
schedule must be shifted upwards for a range of cost parameters
below θ in the neighborhood of θ . Since this applies to all θ , it
7This excludes probability distribution that exhibit a high concentration on low
values. It is satisfied for most typically employed distributions (including the
uniform distribution for which θ¯ = α/2), and it holds for the family of truncations
of F , G(θ) : [d,α]→ [0,1],Gd (θ) := (F(θ)−F(d))/(α−d), provided 0< d < α
is sufficiently large.
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follows that the equilibrium wage schedule must be pointwise higher
than wB(θ) everywhere.
The remainder of the proof is in Appendix 5.A.1.
The intuition for these results is as follows: Consider one firm-union
coalition and suppose its rival plays the wage strategy that is an
equilibrium in the model without signaling. Then, the coalition
benefits from signaling strength by setting an inflated wage that
mislead the rival that its capital input coefficient is lower than it
is. Of course, in equilibrium no misleading signaling can occur.
Therefore, in order to establish an equilibrium, the wage schedule
must be adjusted in such a way that signaling strength becomes
sufficiently costly. In other words, the potential for signaling exerts
an upward pressure on equilibrium wage schedules, even though in
equilibrium no misleading signals are observed.
5.5. Discussion
The present chapter considered decentralized union-firm wage bar-
gaining, assuming firms interact in an oligopoly market, and assum-
ing firms are subject to incomplete information concerning their
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unit cost. The novel feature of the analysis is that wage bargaining
involves a signaling problem. There, firms may have an incentive to
inflate their wage in order to signal strength, with the intention to
gain a strategic advantage in the subsequent oligopoly game.
While no misleading signaling occurs in equilibrium, the potential for
signaling exerts an upward pressure on wages that counterbalances
the externality that is generally seen as weakening the bargaining
power in decentralized wage bargaining.
In further research one might wish to extend the analysis to also
cover the case of centralized wage bargaining by an industry wide
union in order to assess whether the signaling effect may be so strong
as to reverse the rank order of wages in centralized and decentralized
bargaining. However, this involves a complex multilateral bargain-
ing problem under incomplete information. One may also wish to
consider other specifications of the market game where firms’ prod-
ucts are complements or where firms play a Bertrand rather than a
Cournot market game.
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5.A. Appendix
5.A.1. Supplement to the proof of Proposition 5.3
Here we show that, evaluated at z = θ,w=wB , one has ∂z log N < 0,
and thus ∂z N < 0, for allθ , assuming that θ¯ ≥ 211α.
Observe that, evaluated at z = θ,w = wB ,
∂z E(L)= 16
∫ (
−1+ 4
3
)
d F(θ2)= 118
∂z E(L2)=
∫
2L∂z Ld F(θ2)= 19 E(L)
E(L)= 1
36
(
9(1− δ)+7θ¯ −16θ1
)
Therefore, evaluated at z = θ,w = wB ,
2E(L)− (wB− δ)= 136
(
9(1− δ)+11θ¯ −20θ1
)
>
1
36
(
18α+11θ¯ −20θ1
)
(since α < 1−δ/2)
≥ 1
36
(
18α+11θ¯ −20α) (since θ1 ≤ α)
= 1
36
(
11θ¯ −2α)
≥ 0 (since θ¯ ≥ 2
11
α).
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Hence, evaluated at z = θ,w = wB ,
∂z log N = w
′(θ)
w(θ)− δ +
∂z E(L2)
E(L2)
+ ∂z E(L)
E(L)
=− 1
3(wB(θ)− δ) +
E(L)
9E(L2)
+ 1
18E(L)
<− 1
3(wB(θ)− δ) +
E(L)
9E(L)2
+ 1
18E(L)
=− 1
3(wB(θ)− δ) +
1
6E(L)
=−1
3
(
1
(wB(θ)− δ) −
1
2E(L)
)
< 0.
There, the first inequality is based on Jensen’s Inequality concern-
ing a continuous variation of the random variable θ2 for the con-
vex function (·)2, and the last inequality follows from the fact that
wB(θ)− δ < 2E(L), as shown above.
6. Horizontal mergers in
oligopoly: first-price vs.
profit-share auction1
6.1. Introduction
In the present chapter we consider horizontal mergers, assuming that
a takeover target is auctioned among competing firms, and firms have
private information concerning their synergy benefits of a merger.
Our analysis has several distinct features:
• bidders are competitors in a downstream Cournot market game
and synergies take the form of cost reductions,
1This chapter is based on Ding, Fan, and Wolfstetter (2010).
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• bidders have private information concerning the synergy effect
of merging their firm with the takeover target,
• before firms play the oligopoly game they observe either the
merged firm’s synergy parameter or the winning bid,
• bidders may influence their rivals’ beliefs through their bid,
• the merger target is auctioned to the highest bidder, either in a
standard first-price (cash auction) or a profit-share auction.
The presence of synergies assures that mergers are potentially prof-
itable for the coalition of merged and merging firm, and the presence
of private information makes auctions an appealing mechanism for
matching the takeover target with another firm.
Under the predominant corporate law in the U.S., once a takeover
offer has been made, the board of directors is actually obliged to
act like an auctioneer, and get the best price for the stockholder of
the company, which is one of the reasons why a takeover offer must
remain open for at least 20 business days (see Cramton, 1998).2
And indeed, auctions are not only advised but also widely used in
takeovers (see the empirical study by Boone and Mulherin, 2007).
2As ruled in Revlon (1986).
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The fact that bidders are competitors in a downstream oligopoly
implies that the takeover bidding is a somewhat peculiar auction
game where bidding is subject to externalities. In particular, since
non-merged firms benefit from a merger if synergies are low, bid-
ders are subject to a positive externality with positive probability.
Whereas if synergies are sufficiently high, bidders are subject to a
negative externality.
A second peculiar feature of takeover auctions is the fact that they
can use a somewhat unusual but highly profitable auction format.
Ownership stakes in the merged firm make post-merger profits veri-
fiable to all co-owners. This makes it feasible to make the price to
be paid by the winner of the auction conditional on the post-merger
profitability, simply by adopting a share auction in lieu of a standard
“cash auction”. In such a share auction the winner of the auction
awards the owners of the takeover target with an ownership stake in
the merged firm, which entitles them to share of its profits.
Share auctions are more profitable than cash auctions, as we will
show below. And they are widely used in takeover bidding. A case in
point is the takeover of “GE Insurance Solutions” (a major reinsurer)
by “Swiss Re”, which made Swiss Re the world’s largest player in
the oligopolistic reinsurance market. Several bidders participated in
156 Horizontal mergers in oligopoly: first-price vs. profit-share auction
that takeover bidding, including the famous investor Warren Buffett
who was however outbid by Swiss Re. Interestingly, the winning
bid offered GE a significant ownership stake in the form of common
stock, which made GE a major shareholder of Swiss Re (see Boyle,
2005).
In the present chapter we combine the two unique features of takeover
auctions: the presence of significant externalities, due to the down-
stream interaction among bidders, and the possible use of share
auctions in lieu of standard cash auctions.
We consider two specifications of our model: before the oligopoly
game is played, firms can either observe the merged firm’s synergy
parameter or only the winning bid. When firms can only observe
bids (in particular the winning bid), the bidding games involve a
signaling element, which exerts an upward pressure on equilibrium
bids.
The chapter is related to the ongoing debate on horizontal merger.
A starting point of that literature is the “merger paradox” which
observes that “small” mergers are not profitable if firms compete in
a Cournot market game with substitutes and mergers do not involve
synergy benefits (see Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds, 1983).
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However, small mergers become profitable for the coalition of merged
firms if synergies are sufficiently high (see Farrell and Shapiro, 1990)
or firms produce differentiated goods in a Bertrand market game (De-
neckere and Davidson, 1985), or, to some extent, if market demand
is sufficiently concave (see Fauly´-Oller, 1997).
Mergers can also be profitable if firms are uncertain about their
post-merger synergy benefit (Chone´ and Linnemer, 2008, Amir,
Diamantoudi, and Xue, 2009). Indeed, mergers can be profitable
even if, in expectation, there are no synergy benefits, provided the
variance of the unknown synergy benefit is sufficiently high (see
Hamada, 2011).
The use of auctions in horizontal mergers was considered for example
by Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000) for whom takeover bidding in a
Cournot oligopoly is a prime example of an auction that is subject
to positive externalities, if synergies are sufficiently low. Auctions
with positive externalities are viewed as interesting outliers where
pooling occurs if bidders are subject to a minimum bid requirement.
Brusco, Lopomo, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2007) and Ga¨rtner
and Schmutzler (2009) consider mergers when firms are subject to
double private information, because the takeover target does not
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know the synergy benefit brought about by a partner, and prospective
partners do not know each other’s pre-merger unit costs. While the
former adopt an optimal mechanism design perspective, the latter
focus on bargaining issues and aspire to resolve the puzzle why
many horizontal mergers happen to flop, as observed in the empirical
literature (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1989, Moeller, Schlingemann,
and Stulz, 2005). Both incorporate a rich information structure;
however, neither includes a full analysis of the interrelationship with
the downstream oligopoly game.
Similar to Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000), the present chapter adopts
an auction perspective and assumes that firms have private infor-
mation concerning their synergy parameter while firms’ pre-merger
unit costs are common knowledge. However, unlike Jehiel and
Moldovanu (2000), we consider profit-share auctions in addition
to standard cash auctions,3 allow for nonlinear demand, more than
three firms, and assume that firms may observe only an imperfect
signal of the merged firm’s synergy parameter before the oligopoly
3Contingent-payment auctions like profit-share auctions were introduced by
Hansen (1985). Cre´mer (1987) pointed out that if the post-auction valuation is
verifiable, the auctioneer can, in principle, extract the full surplus. Samuelson
(1987) discusses limitations of full surplus extraction. Apart from takeover
bidding, share auctions are widely used in book publishing.
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game is played, as it is the case when firms observe only bids, in
particular the winning bid (like in the analysis of patent licensing by
Das Varma, 2003, Goeree, 2003, Fan, Jun, and Wolfstetter, 2011).
Our main results are as follows: we show that the bidding games
have a separating equilibrium even though firms may be subject to
a positive externality; and we show that a profit-share auction is
more profitable than a first-price auction, regardless of whether firms
observe the merged firm’s synergy parameter or only an imperfect
signal of it.
The plan of the chapter is as follows. Section 6.2 introduces the
framework and assumptions. Section 6.3 considers the benchmark
model in which firms perfectly observe the synergy parameter of the
merged firm before they play the oligopoly game. This assumption is
then replaced in Section 6.4 where bidders observe only the winning
bid, which introduces a signaling issue. The chapter concludes with
a discussion. Some proofs are in the Appendix.
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6.2. Model
Consider a Cournot oligopoly composed of N +1≥ 3 firms among
which one, say firm N +1, is willing to be merged with either one
of the firms {1,2, . . . ,N }. The owners of the takeover target auction
their firm either in a standard first-price or in a profit-share auction,
supplemented by an entry or participation fee. Entry fees may be
necessary to assure that the takeover target does not suffer losses in
some states.
In a profit-share auction bids are shares in the equilibrium profit
of the merged firm that bidders offer conditional on being merged
with firm N +1. The takeover target selects the bidder who offers
the highest share as winner. Profit-share auctions are feasible in the
takeover context because the parties that become co-owners of the
merged firm can naturally verify the post-merger profit of that firm.
If a merger occurs, the merged firm enjoys a synergy benefit in the
form of a lower unit cost. Firms that are not part of the merger have
the same unit cost c, whereas the merged firm has the unit cost c− θ .
Large mergers of more than two firms are not on the agenda or not
approved by the Antitrust Authority.
Prior to the auction, firms {1, . . . ,N } have private information con-
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cerning their synergy parameter θ . From the point of view of other
firms, firms’ synergy parameters are iid random variables, drawn
from the log-concave distribution F : [0,c]→ [0,1], with positive
density, F ′, everywhere. We denote the c.d.f. of the largest synergy
parameter of a sample of N −1 firms by G(θ) := F(θ)N−1 and note
that log-concavity of F implies log-concavity of G.
After the bidding game has been played firms play a Cournot oligopoly
game. Two models are distinguished: In the first model, the synergy
parameter of the merged firm becomes known to all firms before the
oligopoly game is played. In the second model firms only observe
the winning bid from which they draw inferences concerning the
synergy parameter of the merged firm.
In the first model the downstream oligopoly game is one of complete
information, which is fully determined by the cost parameter c and
the synergy parameter of the merged firm, θ . In the second model
the oligopoly game is one of incomplete information. There, firms
update their beliefs concerning the synergy parameter of the merged
firm, after they observe the winning bid. In turn bids may be used to
influence the beliefs of rival bidders, which introduces a signaling
aspect into the bidding game.
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In the following we denote the equilibrium profit of the merged
firm by pim(θ), the equilibrium profit of the firms that have not been
merged by pin(θ), and the (default) equilibrium profits if no merger
has taken place by pi0. Both pim and pin are functions of the synergy
parameter of the firm that has been merged with firm N+1, and pim is
strictly monotone increasing and pin is strictly monotone decreasing
in θ . Obviously, ∀θ : pim(θ) > pi0, and ∀θ > 0 : pim(θ) > pin(θ),
whereas for some θˆ ∈ (0,c),
pin(θ)T pi0 ⇐⇒ θ S θˆ (positive/negative externality). (6.1)
In other words, for low θ the firm that has not been merged bene-
fits from reduced competition due to the merger. However, if the
synergy is sufficiently large, that positive externality turns into a
negative externality, because then the disadvantage of facing a com-
petitor whose cost has been reduced outweighs the benefit of reduced
competition due to the merger.
We assume that c is sufficiently high to assure existence of θˆ < c,
and sufficiently low to assure that mergers do not propel monopoly
at all possible synergies. We also assume that firms are risk neutral
and inverse market demand P is a decreasing and concave function
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of aggregate output.4
Of course, “small” mergers are not profitable for the merger coalition
if synergies are absent: pim(0) < 2pi0 (“merger paradox”).
6.3. Takeover bidding without signaling
Following Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000), we first consider a highly
stylized model in which the synergy parameter becomes common
knowledge after the auction and before the oligopoly game is played.
There, the profits of the merged firm and the non-merged firms are
fully described by the functions pim(θ),pin(θ), which are exclusively
functions of the merged firm’s synergy parameter θ . Of course, if no
firm bids, all firms earn the default equilibrium payoff pi0.
Bid functions are denoted by the Roman letters b (first-price) and s
(profit-share auction).
4This assures existence of a unique pure strategy equilibrium of the oligopoly
game (see Szidarovszky and Yakowitz, 1977).
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6.3.1. First-price auction
The bidder who makes the highest bid wins the auction, the winner
pays his bid, and all those who choose to bid must pay the entry or
participation fee R.
As a working hypothesis suppose b is strictly increasing, and the
entry fee induces a cutoff value of θ , denoted by r , such that b(r)= 0,
and a bidder bids only if his synergy parameter is θ ≥ r and otherwise
abstains from bidding.
Consider a marginal bidder with θ = r . That bidder must be indiffer-
ent between bidding and not bidding:
G(r)(pim(r)−b(r))+
∫ c
r
pin(z)dG(z)− R
= G(r)pi0+
∫ c
r
pin(z)dG(z).
Since pim(θ) is strictly increasing and b(r) = 0 it follows that for
all R ∈ [0,pim(c)−pi0), the entry fee R induces a unique critical
valuation r , which is implicitly defined as the solution of the equation
R = G(r)(pim(r)−pi0) . (6.2)
Proposition 6.1 (First-price auction). The equilibrium strategy of
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the first-price auction is
b(θ)=
∫ θ
r
G ′(x)
G(θ)
(pim(x)−pin(x))dx . (6.3)
Proof. By the assumed monotonicity of b, the equilibrium bidding
problem for a bidder with θ, y ≥ r can be stated in the form:
θ = argmax
y≥r
G(y)(pim(θ)−b(y))+
∫ c
y
pin(z)dG(z)− R. (6.4)
Therefore, b has to solve the differential equation,
(G(θ)b(θ))′ = G ′(θ)(pim(θ)−pin(θ)) . (6.5)
Integrating and using the initial condition b(r)= 0 yields (6.3). To
confirm the assumed strict monotonicity of b, note that pim(θ)−
pin(θ) is positive and strictly increasing for all θ . Using these facts
and applying integration by parts gives:
b′(θ)
= G
′(θ)
G(θ)
(
pim(θ)−pin(θ)− 1G(θ)
∫ θ
r
G ′(x)(pim(x)−pin(x))dx
)
= G
′(θ)
G(θ)2
(
G(r)(pim(r)−pin(r))+
∫ θ
r
∂x (pim(x)−pin(x))G(x)dx
)
> 0.
(6.6)
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Finally, we need to confirm that bidding is more profitable than not
bidding if and only if θ ≥ r . That proof is in Appendix 6.A.2.
In order to pin down the role of the externality implied by mergers,
let bˆ denote the hypothetical equilibrium bid function that would
apply if the loser of the auction were not affected by the merger, i.e,
if pin(θ) were equal to pi0. Then,5
bˆ(θ)−b(θ)T E
(
pin(θ˜)−pi0 | θ˜ ≤ θ
)
T 0. (6.7)
In other words, bidding becomes less aggressive when the conditional
expected value of the externality is positive (which occurs if θ is
sufficiently “small”) and more aggressive when that conditional
expected value is negative. Of course, a positive externality makes
it less attractive to win the auction, which makes bidders less eager
to win, and vice versa. Therefore, this relationship is intuitively
plausible.
Figure 6.1 illustrates this relationship for the example of linear de-
mand, c = 0.49, r = 0.001, F(θ) = θ/c (uniform distribution), and
N = 2. There, the vertical, dotted line separates the range of positive
externalities (pin(θ) > pi0) from negative externalities (pin(θ) < pi0).
5As one can confirm easily, that hypothetical equilibrium bid function is bˆ(θ)=∫ θ
r (pim(x)−pi0)G ′(x)/G(θ)dx .
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Figure 6.1.: Equilibrium first-price auction with (solid) and without
(dashed) externality
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We mention that if we would employ a minimum bid in lieu of an
entry fee requirement, the equilibrium bid function would exhibit
pooling at the reserve price. Jehiel and Moldovanu already observed
that “entry fees and reserve prices are not equivalent in the positive
externality case” (Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2000, p. 782).
6.3.2. Profit-share auction
Now consider the profit-share auction with entry fee R. There,
bidders must pay the entry fee, regardless of winning or losing, the
bidder who offers the highest share wins the auction, the winner has
to grant the promised share s(θ) of the profit of the merged firm, and
losers pay nothing.
As one can easily confirm, R induces the same critical valuation r as
the first-price auction, see (6.2).
Using the same solution procedure as the above, the equilibrium
bidding problem of a bidder with θ, y ≥ r can be stated in the form
of the equilibrium requirement:
θ = argmax
y≥r
G(y)pim(θ)(1− s(y))+
∫ c
y
pin(z)dG(z)− R. (6.8)
Therefore, the equilibrium strategy has to solve the first order differ-
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ential equation
(G(θ)s(θ))′ = G ′(θ)pim(θ)−pin(θ)
pim(θ)
. (6.9)
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Figure 6.2.: Equilibrium profit-share auction with (solid) and without
(dashed) externality
Proposition 6.2 (Profit-share auction). The equilibrium strategy of
the profit-share auction is
s(θ)=
∫ θ
r
G ′(x)
G(θ)
pim(x)−pin(x)
pim(x)
dx . (6.10)
Proof. Integrating the differential equation (6.9), using the initial
condition s(r)= 0, gives the equilibrium strategy (6.10). To confirm
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that s is strictly increasing, as assumed, note that (pim (θ)−pin(θ))/pim (θ)
is positive and strictly increasing. Using these facts and applying
integration by parts gives:
s ′(θ)= G
′(θ)
G(θ)
(
pim(θ)−pin(θ)
pim(θ)
− 1
G(θ)
∫ θ
r
G ′(x)
pim(x)−pin(x)
pim(x)
dx
)
= G
′(θ)
G(θ)2
(
G(r)
pim(r)−pin(r)
pim(r)
+
∫ θ
r
∂x
(
pim(x)−pin(x)
pim(x)
)
G(x)dx
)
> 0.
Finally, we need to confirm the assumed cutoff participation strategy.
The proof is in Appendix 6.A.3.
In Figure 6.2 we plot the payments, s(θ)pim(θ), that are implicitly
offered in equilibrium by bidders provided θ ≥ r . We also plot the
hypothetical payments based on the share function, sˆ(θ), that would
apply if externalities were absent. These plots assume the same
linear example that underlies Figure 6.1. Again, the presence of
externalities exerts a downward pressure on equilibrium bids, except
for high synergy parameters.
Remark 6.1. We mention that in standard auction problems in which
the losers’ payoff is equal to zero and no entry fees are charged,
(6.10) implies s(θ) ≡ 1. Hence, in this case, the share auction has
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no strictly monoton equilibrium. This can be remedied by adding
entry fees or cash prices, as it is typically done in book publishing,
where share auctions are frequently used.
6.3.3. Superiority of the profit-share auction
Proposition 6.3. The profit-share auction is more profitable for the
owners of the merger target than the first-price auction, for all R.
Proof. Let θ be the highest of the sample of N synergy parameters.
Then, the difference in equilibrium profits of firm N +1 in the profit-
share and the first-price auction is equal to:
1U (θ) := s(θ)pim(θ)−b(θ)
= pim(θ)
∫ θ
r
G ′(x)
G(θ)
pim(x)−pin(x)
pim(x)
dx−b(θ)
>
∫ θ
r
G ′(x)
G(θ)
(pim(x)−pin(x))dx−b(θ) (as pi ′m(θ) > 0)
≡ 0 (by (6.3)).
Therefore, the expected profit in the profit-share auction, Us(r) =∫ c
r pim(θ)s(θ)d F(1)(θ)+µ(r)+pi0 F(r)N , is higher than that of the
first-price auction, Uc(r)=
∫ c
r b(θ)d F(1)(θ)+µ(r)+pi0 F(r)N , for
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all r ∈ [0,c) (where µ(r) denotes the expected value of collected
entry fees and F(1)(θ) denotes the c.d.f. of the order statistic of the
highest synergy parameter).
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UcHrL
UsHrL
Π0
Figure 6.3.: Expected profit: profit-share (solid) vs. first-price
(dashed) auction
In Figure 6.3 we plot Uc,Us,pi0 as functions of the critical valuations
r induced by the entry fee R for the example of linear demand,
c = 0.49, N = 2, and F(θ)= θ/c (uniform distribution). Evidently,
the maximum of Us far exceeds that of Uc and Uc far exceeds pi0.
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This indicates that the profit-share auction is considerably more
profitable than the first-price auction and than the status quo prior
to the merger. The figure also suggests that the entry fee plays no
significant role in the share auction, unlike in the first-price auction.
We mention that one may interpret the superiority of the profit-share
auction as an example of the “linkage principle”. According to that
well-known principle, linking the price to a variable that is correlated
with bidders’ private information lowers bidders’ information rent
(Milgrom, 1987).
6.4. Takeover bidding with signaling
An implausible feature of the above model is that the synergy param-
eter of the merged firm becomes known before the oligopoly game
is played. We now switch to the more plausible model in which
firms only observe the winning bid, and then update their beliefs
concerning the synergy parameter of the merged firm before playing
the oligopoly game.
This modification introduces a signaling aspect into the bidding
game. Firms are no longer exclusively concerned with winning or
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losing the auction, but also with how their bid impacts rivals’ beliefs.
In particular, firms may wish to inflate their bids in order to signal
high synergy, with the intention to gain a strategic advantage in the
subsequent oligopoly game.6
In order to visibly distinguish between the two models, equilibrium
bid functions are now denoted by the Greek letters β (first-price) and
σ (profit-share auction).
We employ the following solution procedure: As a working hypoth-
esis suppose the bidding game has a symmetric, strictly monotone
increasing equilibrium that allows the losers of the auction to draw a
perfect inference from the observed winning bid to the underlying
synergy parameter of the merged firm. We consider one bidder, say
bidder 1 with synergy parameter θ , who assumes that his rivals play
the strictly increasing equilibrium strategy β, resp. σ but considers
to make a deviating bid.
Without loss of generality all relevant deviating bids are captured
by bids from the interval [β(r),β(c)], resp. [σ(r),σ (c)], because
bidding outside that interval is obviously dominated. In other words,
6Signaling in auctions with downstream interaction has been analyzed in the
context of patent licensing by Das Varma (2003), Goeree (2003), and Fan, Jun,
and Wolfstetter (2011).
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bidding according to the equilibrium strategy β, resp. σ as if the
synergy parameter were equal to y ∈ (r,c) captures all relevant
deviating bids.
We first characterize all oligopoly subgames that may occur if bid-
der 1 unilaterally deviates from the equilibrium bid while everyone
believes that all rival firms play the equilibrium bidding strategy β
resp. σ .
6.4.1. Downstream oligopoly “subgames”
Suppose y ≥ θ ; then two classes of oligopoly subgames must be
distinguished:7
Case a): y > x := {θ2, . . . , θn} In this case firm 1 wins the auction.
All other firms believe that the synergy parameter of the merged firm
is equal to y. Therefore, they believe to play an N player oligopoly
game that is characterized by the profile of unit costs (c− y,c, . . . ,c).
Denote the equilibrium strategy of players 2, . . . ,N by qn(y) and
their equilibrium profit by pin(y). (The full characterization of the
7The case of y ≤ θ is similar, and requiring that no “downward” deviating bids
should be profitable, yields the same differential equation (6.12), resp. (6.15).
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equilibrium of this game which players (2,3, . . . ,N ) believe to play,
is contained in Appendix 6.6.)
However, firm 1 privately knows that the merged firm’s synergy
parameter is equal to θ rather than the pretended y. Therefore, firm
1 plays its best response strategy
qm(θ, y) := argmax
q
pi(q,qn(y), . . . ,qn(y),θ)
and earns the equilibrium payoff
p¯im(θ, y) := pi(qm(θ, y),qn(y), . . . ,qn(y),θ).
Case b): y < x := max{θ2, . . . , θN } In this case, firm 1 loses the
auction and the synergy parameter realized by the merger is equal
to x . The subsequent oligopoly subgame is characterized by the
profile of unit costs (c,c, . . . ,c,c− x,c, . . . ,c) and the associated
equilibrium profit of firm 1 is denoted by pin(x).
Note that p¯im(θ, y)|y=θ = pim(θ), and ∂y p¯im(θ, y)|y=θ > 0, as we
show in equations (6.29), (6.30) in Appendix 6.A.6.
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6.4.2. First-price auction with signaling
By a procedure similar to that used in the model without signaling,
the equilibrium requirement concerning β can be stated as follows,
for θ ≥ r
θ = argmax
y≥r
G(y)(p¯im(θ, y)−β(y))+
∫ c
y
pin(x)dG(x)− R.
(6.11)
The relationship between r and R is the same as in the model without
signaling.
Therefore, β must solve the differential equation for all θ ≥ r :
(β(θ)G(θ))′ = G ′(θ)(p¯im(θ,θ)−pin(θ))+G(θ)∂y p¯im(θ, y)|y=θ .
(6.12)
And we find:
Proposition 6.4 (First-price auction). In the first-price auction, the
potential for signaling induces more aggressive equilibrium bid-
ding, for all θ > r and for all r:
β(θ)= b(θ)+
∫ θ
r
G(x)
G(θ)
∂y p¯im(x, y)|y=x dx > b(θ). (6.13)
Proof. Using the fact that p¯im(θ, y)|y=θ = pim(θ) and the initial con-
dition, β(r)= 0, it is easy to confirm that β solves the differential
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equation (6.12). The assertion that β(θ) > b(θ),∀θ > r follows from
the fact that ∂y p¯im(x, y)|y=x > 0. To complete the proof one needs
to confirm the assumed strict monotonicity of β, which we confirm
in Appendix 6.A.4.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. If rival bidders would
play the strategy b (which is the equilibrium without signaling), every
bidder would benefit from signaling strength by bidding as if the own
synergy parameter where higher than it is. Of course, in equilibrium
no such misleading signaling can occur. Therefore, the bid function
must be adjusted in such a way that signaling strength is made
sufficiently costly, which is achieved by raising bids pointwise; hence,
β(θ) > b(θ),∀θ > r . In other words, the potential for signaling
exerts an upward pressure on equilibrium bids, to the benefit of the
owners of the takeover target.
6.4.3. Profit-share auction with signaling
Denote the equilibrium bid function in the signaling model by σ .
Similar to the above, the equilibrium requirement takes the form, for
6.4 Takeover bidding with signaling 179
all θ ≥ r ,
θ = argmax
y≥r
G(y)p¯im(θ, y)(1−σ(y))+
∫ c
y
pin(z)dG(z)− R.
(6.14)
The relationship between r and R is the same as in the model without
signaling.
Therefore, σ must solve the differential equation for all θ ≥ r :
σ ′(θ)+α(θ)σ (θ)− (α(θ)−γ (θ))= 0 (6.15)
α(θ) := ∂θ ln G(θ)+ ∂y ln p¯im(θ, y)|y=θ (6.16)
γ (θ) := G
′(θ)
G(θ)
pin(θ)
p¯im(θ,θ)
. (6.17)
And we find:
Proposition 6.5 (Profit-share auction). The equilibrium strategy of
the profit-share auction in the model with signaling is, for all θ ≥ r:
σ(θ)=
∫ θ
r
(α(x)−γ (x))ϕ(x,θ)dx (6.18)
ϕ(x,θ) := exp
(
−
∫ θ
x
α(z)dz
)
. (6.19)
Proof. It is straightforward to confirm that the asserted equilibrium
bid function (6.18) solves the differential equation (6.15).
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For a constructive proof, multiply the differential equation with the
positive valued µ(θ) := exp
(∫ θ
r α(z)dz
)
. Then, one can rewrite the
differential equation (6.15) as
(µ(θ)σ (θ))′ = µ(θ)(α(θ)−γ (θ)) .
Integrating and using the initial condition σ(r)= 0 yields (6.18).
The assumed strict monotonicity of σ is confirmed in Appendix
6.A.5.
Finally, we show that the revenue ranking of the two auction formats
extends to the signaling model:
Proposition 6.6. The profit-share auction is more profitable than
the first-price auction, for all R.
Proof. Using the definitions of α and γ , rewrite the bid function β
as:
β(θ)= 1
G(θ)
∫ θ
r
(α(x)−γ (x))G(x)p¯im(x, x)dx .
Let θ be the highest of the sample of N synergy parameters. Then,
the difference between the equilibrium profits of the takeover target
firm N +1 in the profit-share and the first-price auction is:
1U (θ) := σ(θ)p¯im(θ,θ)−β(θ)
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=
∫ θ
r
(α(x)−γ (x))
(
ϕ(x,θ)p¯im(θ,θ)− G(x)G(θ) p¯im(x, x)
)
dx .
We will show that ϕ(x,θ)p¯im(θ,θ)− G(x)G(θ) p¯im(x, x) > 0, which to-
gether with the fact that α(x)−γ (x) > 0 proves 1U (θ) > 0,∀θ .
A bit of rearranging gives:
ϕ(x,θ)p¯im(θ,θ)− G(x)G(θ) p¯im(x, x)
= exp
(
−
∫ θ
x
α(z)dz
)
p¯im(θ,θ)− G(x)G(θ) p¯im(x, x)
= exp
(
−
∫ θ
x
(
∂z ln G(z)+ ∂y ln p¯im(z, y)|y=z
)
dz
)
p¯im(θ,θ)
− G(x)
G(θ)
p¯im(x, x)
= G(x)
G(θ)
 p¯im(θ,θ)
exp
(∫ θ
x ∂y ln p¯im(z, y)|y=z)dz
) − p¯im(x, x)
 .
The latter is positive if exp
(∫ θ
x ∂y ln( p¯im(z, y)|y=z)dz
)
< p¯im (θ,θ)
p¯im (x,x)
, or
equivalently if∫ θ
x
∂y ln p¯im(z, y)|y=z dz < ln
p¯im(θ,θ)
p¯im(x, x)
≡
∫ θ
x
∂z ln p¯im(z, y)|y=z dz.
Evidently, the marginal impact of a truthfully revealed cost reduction
on the merged firm’s profit is greater than that of an equally sized
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purely pretended cost reduction; therefore,
∂z p¯im(z, y)|y=z > ∂y p¯im(z, y)|y=z , (6.20)
(for a formal proof see Appendix 6.A.6). Hence, 1U (θ) > 0,∀θ , as
asserted.
6.5. Discussion
One limitation of the present chapter is that we consider only takeovers
that are motivated by synergies. This excludes takeovers that serve
the purpose to reorganize firms that are subject to organization slack.
If such reorganization is the issue, bidders may be willing to pay a
premium for acquiring full residual claimant status, and thus avoid
diluted incentives. This, in turn, tilts the balance in favor of cash
auctions, and it may even make auctions undesirable altogether.
Another issue is that takeovers are typically prompted by individual
bidders or investment banks rather than by the seller. This makes
takeovers particularly prone to preemptive bidding or the prior ac-
quisition of toe-holds that affects bidding.8
8Bulow, Huang, and Klemperer (1999) showed that if a bidder has acquired a
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Last, but not least, our analysis ignores both drastic innovations and
the possibility of building larger coalitions through a sequence of
mergers between two firms (analyzed in Kamien and Zang, 1991,
Bloch, 1995, 1996), and all related regulatory issues (see Nocke and
Whinston, 2010).
6.A. Appendix
6.A.1. Linear example
Here we sketch the linear example that underlies the plots in Figures
6.1-6.3.
There we set N = 2 and assume linear demand P(Q) := max{1−
Q,0},Q := q1+q2, which gives pi0 = (1−c)2/16, pim(θ)= (1−c+2θ)2/9,
pin(θ)= (1−c−θ)2/9. Hence, for all θ : pim(θ) > pi0, and for all θ > 0 :
pim(θ) > pin(θ), and
pin(θ)T pi0 ⇐⇒ θ S θˆ := (1−c)/4 (positive/negative externality).
toehold prior to bidding, and the auction is an open-ascending auction, the
equilibrium tends to be highly asymmetric and the equilibrium price may be
“low”.
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To compute the bid functions, b,s and the expected profits Uc,Us
plotted in Figs. 6.1, 6.3, we also assume F(θ)= θ/c (uniform distri-
bution). The computations are in a Mathematica file available upon
request from the authors.
6.A.2. Supplement to the proof of Proposition 6.1
We show that participation in the first-price auction is more profitable
than non-participation if and only if θ ≥ r . Denote the expected
payoff from bidding by 5p, from non-bidding by 5n , and 1 :=
5p−5n .
1) Let θ > r , then
1=
(
G(θ)(pim(θ)−b(θ))+
∫ c
θ
pin(z)dG(z)− R
)
−
(
G(r)pi0+
∫ c
r
pin(z)dG(z)
)
.
Evidently, 1(r) = 0, by definition of r , and 5n is independent of
θ . Therefore, using (6.5), ∂θ1= ∂θ5p = G(θ)∂θpim(θ) > 0. Hence,
1> 0,∀θ > r .
2) Let θ < r and suppose a bidder participates and makes a bid b(y),
as if his synergy parameter were equal to y ≥ r > θ . Then, using
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(6.2), (6.3), and applying integration by parts,
1=
(
G(y)(pim(θ)−b(y))+
∫ c
y
pin(z)dG(z)− R
)
−
(
G(r)pi0+
∫ c
r
pin(z)dG(z)
)
= G(y)(pim(θ)−b(y))−
∫ y
r
pin(z)dG(z)−G(r)pim(r)
= G(y)(pim(θ)−pim(y))+
∫ y
r
∂zpim(z)G(z)dz
= G(y)pim(θ)−G(r)pim(r)−
∫ y
r
pim(z)dG(z)
< G(y)pim(θ)−G(r)pim(r)−pim(r)(G(y)−G(r))
= G(y)(pim(θ)−pim(r)) < 0 (since θ < r ).
6.A.3. Supplement to the proof of Proposition 6.2
Like in Appendix 6.A.2 we show that participation in the profit-share
auction is more profitable than non-participation if and only if θ ≥ r .
1) Let θ > r , then
1=
(
G(θ)pim(θ)(1− s(θ))+
∫ c
θ
pin(z)dG(z)− R
)
−
(
G(r)pi0+
∫ c
r
pin(z)dG(z)
)
.
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Evidently, 1(r)= 0, by definition of r , and 5n is independent of θ .
Therefore, using (6.9), ∂θ1= ∂θ5p = G(θ)(1− s(θ))∂θpim(θ) > 0.
Hence, 1> 0,∀θ > r .
2) Let θ < r and suppose a bidder participates and makes a bid s(y),
as if his synergy parameter were equal to y ≥ r > θ . Then, using
(6.2), (6.10), one has,
1=
(
G(y)pim(θ)(1− s(y))+
∫ c
y
pin(z)dG(z)− R
)
−
(
G(r)pi0+
∫ c
r
pin(z)dG(z)
)
= G(y)pim(θ)−G(r)pim(r)
−
∫ y
r
(
pin(z)+pim(θ)
(
1− pin(z)
pim(z)
))
dG(z)
= G(r)(pim(θ)−pim(r))−
∫ y
r
pin(z)(pim(z)−pim(θ))
pim(z)
dG(z)
< 0 (by y ≥ r > θ ).
6.A.4. Supplement to the proof of Proposition 6.4
β ′(θ)= b′(θ)− G
′(θ)
G(θ)2
∫ θ
r
∂y p¯im(z, y)|y=z G(z)dz+ ∂y p¯im(θ, y)|y=θ
= G
′(θ)
G(θ)2
(
G(r)(pim(r)−pin(r))+
∫ θ
r
d
dz
(p¯im(z, z)−pin(z))G(z)dz
)
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− G
′(θ)
G(θ)2
∫ θ
r
∂y p¯im(z, y)|y=z G(z)dz+ ∂y p¯im(θ, y)|y=θ (by (6.6))
= G
′(θ)
G(θ)2
(∫ θ
r
(
d
dz
(p¯im(z, z)−pin(z))− ∂y p¯im(z, y)|y=z
)
G(z)dz
+G(r)(p¯im(r,r)−pin(r))
)
+ ∂y p¯im(θ, y)|y=θ
= G
′(θ)
G(θ)2
(∫ θ
r
(
∂z
(
p¯im(z, y)|y=z−pin(z)
))
G(z)dz
+G(r)(p¯im(r,r)−pin(r))
)
+ ∂y p¯im(θ, y)|y=θ
> 0.
6.A.5. Supplement to the proof of Proposition 6.5
Note that ∂θϕ(x,θ)=−∂xϕ(x,θ)α(θ)ϕ(x) . We have then, by differenti-
ating (6.18),
σ ′(θ)= α(θ)−γ (θ)−α(θ)
∫ θ
r
(α(x)−γ (x))ϕ(x,θ)dx (6.21)
= (α(θ)−γ (θ))−α(θ)
∫ θ
r
(
1− γ (x)
α(x)
)
∂xϕ(x,θ)dx
(6.22)
= α(θ)
α(r)
(α(r)−γ (r))ϕ(r,θ)
+α(θ)
∫ θ
r
ϕ(x,θ)∂x
(
1− γ (x)
α(x)
)
dx, (6.23)
which is positive if γ (x)
α(x) is decreasing.
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A bit of rearranging gives,
γ (x)
α(x)
=
G ′(x)
G(x)
p¯in(x)
p¯im (x,x)
G ′(x)
G(x) +
∂y p¯im (x,y)|y=x
p¯im (x,x)
(6.24)
= pin(x)
p¯im(x, x)+ ∂y pim(x, y)|y=x G(x)G ′(x)
. (6.25)
This is strictly monotone decreasing, since p¯im is increasing in x and
y, by equation (6.28); ∂yp¯im(x, y) is increasing in x , since
∂yx p¯im(x, y)= (N−1)q ′n(y)
(
P ′(·)+qm(x, y)P ′′(·)
)
∂xqm(x, y)> 0;
(6.26)
pin is decreasing in x , and G is log-concave. Hence, it follows
immediately that σ ′(x) > 0, as asserted.
6.A.6. Supplement to the proof of Proposition 6.6
Here we prove inequality (6.20). Note that (here z is the true and y
the pretended cost reduction of firm 1)
p¯im(z, y) := (P(qm(z, y)+ (N −1)qn(y))− c+ z)qm(z, y).
By the envelope theorem,
∂zp¯im(z, y)= qm(z, y) (6.27)
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∂yp¯im(z, y)= P ′(·)(N −1)q ′n(y)qm(z, y). (6.28)
Therefore,
∂zp¯im(z, y)− ∂yp¯im(z, y)=
(
1− P ′(·)(N −1)q ′n(y)
)
qm(z, y).
(6.29)
By construction, if firm 1 wins the auction, the N − 1 other firms
believe that they play an oligopoly game with the profile of unit cost
(c− y,c, . . . ,c), which has the equilibrium solution:9
q∗m(y)= argmaxq (P(q+ (N −1)qn(y))− c+ y)q,
qn(y)= argmax
q
(
P(q∗m(y)+ (N −2)qn(y)+q)− c
)
q.
The associated first–order conditions are:
P ′(q∗m(y)+ (N −1)qn(y))q∗m(y)
+P(q∗m(y)+ (N −1)qn(y))− c+ y = 0
P ′(q∗m(y)+ (N −1)qn(y))qn(y)
+P(q∗m(y)+ (N −1)qn(y))− c = 0.
9Note, q∗m(y) is the strategy that firms (2,3, . . .N ) believe firm 1 to play; it is not
the strategy that firm 1 actually plays, since firm 1 has private information about
its cost reduction.
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Differentiating these w.r.t. y, and solving the equation system for
q ′n(y) one finds:
q ′n(y)=
P ′(·)+ P ′′(·)qn(y)
P ′(·)((N +1)P ′(·)+ P ′′(·)(q∗m(y)+ (N −1)qn(y))) .
(6.30)
Finally, substituting (6.30) into (6.29), confirms (6.20):
∂zp¯im(z, y)− ∂¯ypim(z, y)=
(
1− P ′(·)(N −1)q ′n(y)
)
qm(z, y)
= 2P
′(·)+ P ′′(·)q∗m(y)
(N +1)P ′(·)+ P ′′(·)(q∗m(y)+ (N −1)qn(y))qm(z, y) > 0.
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